Developing Europe’s Rural Regions in the Era of Globalisation
An interpretative model for better anticipating and responding to Challenges for regional development in an evolving international context.

WP5:
Synthesis and Contextualisation of Research and Development of an Interpretative Model

Deliverable 5.1
Literature Review and Conceptual Framework
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1. **Introduction**

Globalisation increasingly frames the challenges for regional development in Europe. As the European Commission has observed, “globalization is seen to touch every walk of life – opening doors, creating opportunities, raising apprehensions”, such that “our response to globalization has moved to the heart of the EU policy agenda” (CEC, 2007).

The delicate balance of threats and opportunities presented by globalisation is particularly significant for rural regions – which constitute 91% of the EU land area, house over 50% of its population, generate 45% of its Gross Added Value and provide 53% of employment (CEC, 2006). Traditional industries such as agriculture and forestry are vulnerable to global competition and deregulation, rural communities are exposed to the effects of transnational migration and increasingly internationalised property markets, and established practices of environmental management are challenged by the intervention of global actors and concerns. Indeed, whilst much political discussion has focused on the implications of global trade liberalisation for the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the EU’s Rural Affairs Commissioner, Mariann Fischer Boel has acknowledged that “the challenges of globalization apply not only to farming but also to the rural economies, landscapes and societies in which that farming activity takes place” (Fischer Boel, 2007).

At the same time, globalisation has re-ordered notions of ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ that have historically marginalised rural regions (CEC, 1999; Gløersen, 2005; McDonagh, 2002; Vaishar, 2006; Woods, 2007a), and has opened up new markets for rural enterprises and attracted new investors to rural areas. The adoption of appropriate responses both to the challenges and to the opportunities presented by globalisation is hence critical to the future development of rural regions, yet the evidence base on which such strategies can be founded is currently limited.

The DERREG project (‘Developing Europe’s Rural Regions in the Era of Globalisation’), aims to address this knowledge gap and to formulate a better
understanding of how regional development strategies can engage with globalisation in rural Europe, based on analysis of empirical evidence from ten case study regions across four domains of activity. These emphasize the engagement of rural businesses in global networks (WP 1); international migration and the mobility of rural populations (WP 2); sustainable development and the rural eco-economy (WP 3); and support for capacity-building and innovation in rural ‘learning regions’ (WP 4).

The research is underpinned by the principle that rural regions are proactive regions with the potential to engage constructively with the challenges presented by globalisation and to capitalise on the opportunities created. The purpose of this paper is to elaborate this conceptual framework and to explain the thinking behind the perspective. The paper is divided into five main parts. The first part briefly outlines the dynamics of change in rural Europe and positions the research in a broader geographical and historical context. The second part reviews approaches to globalisation in the existing literature, with a particular emphasis on rural research on globalisation. The third part focuses in on questions about how globalisation acts to restructure regions and places and introduces the relational approach to globalisation. The fourth part briefly reviews literature on models of rural development, drawing in particular on findings from the recently completed ETUDE project. Finally, the fifth section outlines the principles of the conceptual framework that will be followed in the DERREG project.
2. The Dynamics of Change in Rural Europe

2.1. The European ‘Rural Mosaic’

The rural regions of Europe encompass a vast area comprised of diverse landscapes, environments, social and economic structures, and cultures. They range from the semi-arid fringes of the Mediterranean to the Arctic periphery of Scandinavia, from remote islands off-shore from Ireland to peri-urban villages hard by major cities (see box 2.1). Hoggart et al. (1995) accordingly refer to ‘the rural mosaic’ of Europe and observe that “differential tendencies in the development of rural areas relate not only to existing socioeconomic disparities, measured by the level of unemployment or regional GDP, but also to past and future trajectories linked to the ageing of populations, new demands for shifts in employment, the role of women in the labour force and environmental concerns” (pp 65-66).

Yet, it is important to recognise that the differentiated geography of rural Europe is not static, but dynamic, shifting according to patterns of social and economic restructuring and trajectories of political reform. The contemporary era of globalisation and late capitalism arguably represents a heightened period of flux, with Hoggart and Paniagua (2001) correctly asserting that the appellation ‘restructuring’ as commonly applied to these processes of change must necessarily imply an inter-connected multi-sectoral transformation with both quantitative and qualitative effects. However, at the same time care must be taken to avoid over-stating the exceptionalism of the present era. Collantes (2009), for example, argues that the restructuring of rural Europe should be viewed as a long-term process extending from the mid 19th century and associated with European industrialisation. From this long-term perspective, he contends, the incremental and differentiated progression of rural restructuring becomes apparent, with for instance, the transition away from dependency on agricultural employment staggered over more than a century between different regions (table 2.1).
More broadly, however, the long-term perspective reveals a clear convergence of rural regions, as ‘lagging-regions’ have caught up with regions with earlier experiences of transformation, and have become subject to the same on-going processes of restructuring. As recently as 1950, for example, there was a striking contrast in the significance of agricultural employment in the rural regions of countries such as Denmark, Germany, Hungary and Italy (all over 70%), with its significance in rural Britain (35% of rural employment). By 2000, however, the degree of difference had narrowed, with widespread implications for the functioning of rural economies and societies across these countries (figure 2.1).
Box 2.1: Defining Rural Regions

The Council of Europe defines rural areas as “a stretch of inland or coastal countryside, including small towns and villages, where the main part of the area is used for agriculture, forestry, aquaculture and fisheries; economic and cultural activities of country-dwellers; non-urban recreation and leisure areas and other purposes such as housing” (quoted by McDonagh, 2007, p. 89). However, the translation of this broad description into a grounded delimitation of rural territories is notoriously difficult.

Perceptions of rurality vary with geographical context, and each EU member state uses its own official classification of urban and rural areas. Some of these are based on population size, others also make reference to other factors such as population density and settlement form (Hoggart et al., 1995; Woods, 2005). In many cases, ‘rural’ areas are defined negatively, as those territories not meeting the criteria of an ‘urban area’, and the one unifying characteristic between different rural definitions is that rural areas are ‘not-urban’.

In DERREG we have adopted a pragmatic approach based on the OECD classification of rural areas, which is widely used in the EU. The OECD model operates at the scale of LAU2 (Local Administrative Units 2, previously known as NUTS5), which equates to municipalities in most EU countries. Communities at this scale are classified as rural if they have a population density of less than 150 inhabitants/km². This classification is then used to categorize regions at NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 levels as predominantly rural (over 50% of the regional population living in rural communities), significantly rural (15% - 50% of the population living in rural communities) or predominantly urban (less than 15% of the population living in rural communities) (McDonagh, 2007).

Eight of the ten case study areas examined in DERREG are located in NUTS 3 regions classified as predominantly or significantly rural, and it is the regions in these categories that will be used in comparing and contextualising the case studies within rural Europe as a whole. However, in setting the parameters of the research, we deviate from the OECD model in two ways. Firstly, we recognise that by implication there are rural communities within predominantly urban regions, and consequently two of the case study areas are in predominantly urban regions. Secondly, we also recognise that there will be small towns in predominantly and significantly rural regions that will not meet the OECD definition of a rural community, but which play a pivotal and fully integrated function in the local rural economy and society. Such towns will be included in our research where appropriate.
Although we have established the spatial parameters of the research using a quantitative approach, we recognise that the map of rural Europe produced is not absolute or definitive, and also that no causality can be attributed to rurality defined in this manner. In all the case study areas the definition and perception of rurality will be contested with contrasting and conflicting discourses of rurality articulated by different actors. This may have implications for the reception of globalisation and its impacts, as well as for attitudes towards different rural development strategies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agricultural employment (%)</th>
<th>When did non-agricultural employment rise about 50% (*) and 75% (X)?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scottish Highlands</td>
<td>11      4  *  X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss Alps</td>
<td>9       5  *  *  X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Alps</td>
<td>8       3  *  X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian Alps</td>
<td>15      4  *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apennines</td>
<td>36 a    8  *  X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordillera Cantábrica</td>
<td>42 X    15  *  X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Pyrenees</td>
<td>21      9  *  X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish inland ranges</td>
<td>41      15  *  X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordillera Bética</td>
<td>55      25  *</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1: The decline of agricultural employment in selected European upland rural regions (Source: Collantes, 2009)

Figure 2.1: Agriculture-dependent population as proportion of rural population, 1950-2000 (Source: Woods, 2005)
Similarly, political-economic reforms have contributed to convergence. The transition to democracy in central and eastern Europe and in Greece, Portugal and Spain, together with the move from a planned economy to a market economy in the post-socialist states of central and eastern Europe, has brought all of rural Europe within the framework of free market liberal democracy removing differences that previously existed in terms of property ownership, economic planning and freedom of movement. Moreover, the expansion and integration of the European Union has served to promote convergence in terms of the implementation of the single market, and common approaches to rural development (see section 2.2 below).

Yet, rural Europe has not become homogenised. There remain significant regional variations in the composition of rural economies, in levels of wealth creation and household income, in unemployment rates and welfare dependency, in demographic structure and migration trends and so on (table 2.2). Some of these patterns reflect geographical conditions of accessibility and distance from major urban centres. For example, the rural regions with a GDP of less than 75% of the EU average that qualified for Objective 1 support in the 2000-6 round of the EU Structural Funds were largely concentrated on the continent’s periphery (figure 2.2). However, not all patterns of geographical different fit the core-periphery model, with the map of population change, for example, displaying a more complex and nuanced picture (figure 2.3). Moreover, socio-economic conditions can vary considerably within rural regions, down to the community level, with pockets of deprivation within prosperous regions, and pockets of depopulation within growing regions, and vice versa.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Predominantly Rural Regions</th>
<th>Significantly Rural Regions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Max</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (pps)</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>77.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (%)</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Employed in primary sector</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net migration (per 1000)</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Population aged over 65</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.2: Variation in key indicators in rural regions in EU (Source: Rural Development Report 2008)
Figure 2.2: Regions qualifying for Objective 1 support from the European Structural Funds, 2000 – 2006 (Source: European Commission)

Figure 2.3: Net migration to/from NUTS2 regions, 2000 – 2003 (Source: Eurostat)
Thus, as Schmied (2005) observes, in the context of recent restructuring “there have been winning and losing regions, winning and losing villages, winning and losing social groups, winning and losing households and individuals” (p. 5). She suggests that differences between regions may reflect differences in natural, human and cultural resources, socio-economic structure and location, but that other factors may also contribute, such that “rural development is the result of a complicated, but overall positive matching of internal conditions with external influences whose minutiae are (still!) largely unknown” (pp 5-6). Bryden and Bollman (2000) similarly point to the complex interplay of influences in shaping the differential geography of rural Europe under globalisation:

“The evidence of the recent past ... is that some rural areas are 'better placed' than others to adapt to these processes of 'opening up' and the consequential exposure to external forces, although the causal factors are not obvious. Amongst the explanations of rural success we find those focusing on factor endowments, factor prices, entrepreneurial capacities, good luck, 'social capital', amenities, proximity to wealthy urban population with increasing lifestyle demands on rural areas, etc.” (p. 186)

2.2. Constructing the European Countryside

As noted above, the European Union has played a notable role in supporting convergence between the socio-economic trajectories of rural regions in Europe. This has been achieved in four main ways. Firstly, in developing the Single European Market, the EU has eroded differences in economic structures and regulations and has sought to standardise market conditions across Europe. Whilst deregulation has encouraged some degree of regional specialisation in certain sectors, more broadly economic integration has produced convergence in regional economies. Secondly, the EU has directly and deliberately sought to reduce regional disparities in economic performance and living conditions through its cohesion instruments. The European Regional Development Fund has been used to target support in assisting ‘lagging-regions’ with low GDP relative to the EU norm, regions undergoing significant economic restructuring, and
peripheral regions. The re-branding of targeted regions as ‘Convergence Regions’ in the present funding period has made this agenda explicit.

Thirdly, through the delivery of pan-European programmes for rural or regional development, such as LEADER and INTERREG (see box 2.2), the EU has promoted both common approaches to rural development, and common mechanisms for implementing development strategies. As Smith (1998) comments, “one of the most fascinating aspects of studying the political impact of EU rural development policy is discovering that European norms actually do contribute to restructuring the way public action takes place in the most far-flung corners of ... member states” (p. 231). Moreover, programmes such as LEADER have encouraged networking and information-sharing between regional groups, thus facilitating the circulation of common ideas and methods across rural Europe.

**Box 2.2: EU Instruments for Rural and Regional Development**

**Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)**
The CAP has been the major instrument for supporting rural development since the establishment of the European Economic Community in 1957. As outlined in the Treaty of Rome, the CAP aimed to increase productivity, stabilise markets and improving the living standards of the agricultural population, delivered through the mechanisms of price supports, market intervention and grants for modernisation. Issues of over-production forced the CAP to engage with the diversification of rural economies in the 1980s, and the Agenda 2000 reforms in 1999 divided the CAP into two pillars: production support and rural development.

Pillar 2 of the CAP directly supports measures for rural development through the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, according to strategies outlined in national rural development plans in each of the member states. These detail actions to be taken towards each of the three axes defined in European Council Regulation 1698/2005: Axis 1 – improving agricultural competitiveness; Axis 2 – improving the environment and supporting land management; and Axis 3 – improving the quality of life and diversifying the economy in rural areas. Additionally, a fourth axis aims to implement local strategies for rural development through public-private partnerships, extending the previous LEADER Community Initiative (see below). Total funds of approximately €10-13bn per annum are
available for rural development through the four axes between 2007 and 2013, with member states able to transfer more money to rural development measures from direct farm payments through the practice of ‘modulation’.

**LEADER**

The LEADER programme was initially developed as a ‘Community Initiative’ of the EU in 1991, aimed at supporting local ‘bottom-up’ actions for territorially-focused rural development. LEADER is delivered through locally-constituted action groups, which are partnerships of public and private sector actors, which set their own priorities and strategies. Over 900 local action groups were supported during the third term of the programme, LEADER+, between 2000 and 2006, with €2,105 million of EU funds match-funded from public and private sources. In addition to supporting territorial development, LEADER also aimed to promote inter-territorial and transnational cooperation, and the networking of rural areas. The LEADER approach and brand has been continued after 2007 as the fourth axis of rural development under Pillar 2 of the CAP.

**INTERREG**

The INTERREG programme is an EU ‘Community Initiative’ that aims to stimulate inter-regional cooperation within the EU. The main focus is on cross-border partnerships and initiatives, but support is also available for transnational cooperation between non-contiguous regions. Whilst INTERREG is not explicitly targeted at rural regions, it has been notable mechanism for regional development in many rural regions, especially those in border areas. Established in 1989, INTERREG is now in its fourth funding period (2007 – 2013).

**Cohesion Policy and Structural Funds**

In addition to support for rural development under the CAP, rural regions in the EU have also benefited from support for regional development under the EU Cohesion Policy, funded through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). Before 2007, EU Structural Funds were allocated according to a number of ‘objectives’ that aimed to reduce regional disparities, support regions undergoing economic adjustments and support social cohesion. Objective 1 aimed to develop the least favoured regions of the EU, with funding provided to regions with a GDP of less than 75% of the EU average, or a population density of fewer than eight people per square kilometre (the latter areas had been supported under Objective 6 before 2000). Extensive rural areas in Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Wales and eastern Germany secured Objective 1 funding between 2000 and 2006, with a total of over €135 billion allocated (Woods, 2005).
Prior to 2000, rural regions were directly targeted through Objective 5b of the European Structural Funds, which was combined into a new ‘Objective 2’ for 2000 to 2006, aiming to revitalise areas facing structural difficulties. Eligibility was awarded according to criteria including population density, agricultural employment and unemployment rates, and determined at a national level within a national allocation.

From 2007 onwards, EU Cohesion Policy has been re-organised around three new objectives. The previous Objective 1 has been replaced by a new Convergence Objectives, with funding awarded to NUTS 2 regions with a GDP of less than 75% of the EU average only. Rural areas continue to comprise a large proportion of the Convergence Regions, including almost all rural regions in the 2004 and 2008 Accession States, and some rural regions in Greece, eastern Germany, southern Italy, Spain, Portugal, Wales and south-west England (see map below). Transitional support is also available for certain specified ‘phasing-in’ and ‘phasing-out’ regions, including the West of Ireland. Regions not qualifying for Convergence funding may receive support under the Regional Competitiveness and Employment Objective, and the Territorial Cooperation Objective, which now incorporates INTERREG (see above).
Fourthly, the EU has also contributed to the discursive construction of rural Europe as a coherent imagined space through the formulation and elaboration of its policies. This started with the development of the Common Agricultural Policy, which Gray (2000) notes “became the major vehicle for the construction of European communal space and the codification of European common meanings about agriculture and rural society that could be agreed to by people representing different member states” (p. 33). As Gray observes, the discursive construction of rural Europe through the CAP inevitably prioritised agricultural perspectives and “represented rurality as a configuration of agriculture and rural space in which agriculture is the encompassing concept defining the nature and values pervading the whole of rural space” (ibid., p. 35).

Furthermore, not only did the CAP discursively construct rural Europe as a communal space that could be managed through regulation of the agricultural economy, but the implementation of its measures contributed to the material reproduction of the rural as locality, as farmers followed and adapted to the standardisation of approaches and regulations (Gray, 2000).

The agricultural emphasis began to be diluted with the publication of the EC’s Future of Rural Society report in 1988, which implicitly promoted a new representation where “agriculture exists within and is encompassed by rural space and society rather than the other way around as it was in the earlier representation” (Gray, 2000, p. 42). In adopting a broader perspective, the Future of Rural Society report recognised the differentiation of rural regions along an urban-rural continuum, and identified different rural development trajectories depending on context.

The ‘Cork Declaration’ issued by the European Conference on Rural Development in November 1996 further demoted the significance placed on agriculture, and drew more explicit connections between the wider social and economic resources of rural regions and the appropriate mode of development, stating that “the emphasis must be on participation and a ‘bottom up’ approach, which harnesses the creativity and solidarity of rural communities”. Yet, the Cork Declaration also displays the tension inherent to the idea of rural Europe, on the one hand
promoting subsidiarity and endogenous solutions (implicitly acknowledging the failure of top-down common solutions), but also making bold, general statements about the nature of rural Europe as a communal space.

The progression from the original formulation of the CAP to the Cork Declaration marks a transition from a sectoral framing of rural Europe, in which the definition of rurality is closely tied to agriculture, to a territorial framing. However, although the Cork Declaration asserts that the rural areas of Europe “are characterised by a unique cultural, economic and social fabric”, it provides little indication of what actually holds these areas together as a coherent, communal space if the pivotal function of agriculture is removed.

The problem of territorialising rural Europe became even more apparent with the elaboration of the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP), which aimed to model and project the spatial inter-relations and dynamics of Europe’s regions. As Richardson (2000) records, the ESDP was an urban-centric construction and initially conflated rurality and peripherality, attracting criticism from Nordic countries who perceived their own distinctive peripherality to be diluted by this approach. Subsequent iterations focused more on urban-rural relations, but in doing so made the case for the dissolution of the distinction between urban and rural space and the conceptualisation of new functional regions anchored around urban poles (taken forward in the idea of ‘city-regions’). Such a conclusion marks the dissipation of rural Europe as an imagined communal space and also questions the relevance of the ‘rural’ as a spatial category in contemporary Europe. As Richardson comments,

“The emphasis on cities and regions as the drivers of development and foci of policy attention, threatens the identity of rural areas. For the purposes of spatial policy, the implication is that some rural areas will be subsumed into peripheral rural regions and others into predominantly urban regions. Peripheral rural regions will be classified according to whether they show structural weaknesses. It is intended that this process of spatial distinction will be carried out at administrative levels from the regional to the European. This is where the ESDP begins to bite, as it establishes a framework which can direct
EU measures, as well as those at national and regional level, within a concerted set of spatial objectives which its authors believe have already been successfully framed ... What interests will be excluded or marginalized along the way? In the loss of a fine grain focus on rurality, the voice of local communities in both peripheral and more urbanized regions seems to be a distant one.” (Richardson, 2000, pp 66-67).

2.3. Researching Rural Europe

The problems of definition that have emerged in attempts to conceptualise rural space in EU policy have also been evident in the geographical framing of recent research on rural development in Europe. Some projects have been directly informed by the ESDP’s modelling of urban-rural relations, notably the NEWRUR project in FP 5 which examined peri-urban districts within ‘city-regions’, whilst others have exhibited a similar conflation of rurality and peripherality to that identified by Richardson (2000).

FERP, or the ‘Future of Europe’s Rural Periphery’, funded by FP 5, is an example of the latter. Although the concept of peripherality was core to its framing, this was largely conflated with rurality, understanding rural areas as peripheral to urban centres (Labriandis, 2004). The study did recognise degrees of peripherality within rural space, producing a sophisticated analysis and categorisation of Europe’s rural regions in a multi-level typology structured by accessibility, but sub-divided by economic performance, dynamism and the importance of agriculture. Yet, the four of the nine case studies examined further in FERP were categorised as among the ‘most accessible’ rural regions. As such, the findings of FERP, which identified factors shaping entrepreneurial activity in the case study regions and proposed development paths for different types of rural regions based on their economic base, are implicitly intended to be generalisable for rural regions of Europe as a whole (Labriandis, 2004).

NEWRUR, or ‘Urban Pressure on Rural Areas: Mutations and dynamics of peri-urban rural processes’, in contrast, followed the ESDP as mentioned above in focusing on rural areas close to city fringes (Bertrand and Kreibich, 2006;
Hoggart, 2005). In doing so, the project developed an understanding of districts that are frequently excluded from definitions of rural Europe that start only with regions classified as significantly or predominantly rural, such as FERP. As such, NEWRUR implicitly challenged the framing of rural Europe in much previous work, but also engaged critically with the model of urban-rural relations implied in the concept of city-regions. In particular, NEWRUR was able to assert the significance of rural areas as key zones for social and economic development within city-regions, supporting the message of the ESDP that “only with equality in rural-urban relationships will city-regions generate the creative capacity required to heighten local capacities to compete outside the European core” (Hoggart, 2005, p. 2), but critiquing the urban-centric focus of some city-region literature. At the same time, however, NEWRUR emphasised differences between rural fringe dynamics in different city-regions, thus reinforcing the subjugation of ‘rural’ as a category below region.

FERP and NEWRUR hence represent contrasting spatial perspectives on rural Europe – the former positioning rural space as peripheral to the urban, but internally differentiated by accessibility and levels of development; the latter emphasising the co-dependence of urban and rural spaces within regional systems.

However, the differentiation of rural space need not necessarily be driven by accessibility and proximity to urban centres. The ETUDE project in FP 6 adopted an alternative representation of the spatial diversity of rural Europe comprising ‘five extreme poles’ and “one interlinked, somewhat floating, category” (Van der Ploeg et al., 2008, p 5), based on the quantitative significance of agriculture. These categories include:

- **Specialized agricultural areas**, where farming shows high degrees of specialization, intensity and scale, and where other economic sectors are only weakly connected to agriculture.
- **Peripheral areas**, where farming never played a major role, or where agriculture has been significant but is in decline.
• "New rural areas", where agriculture is developing along the lines of multifunctionality, and is increasingly intertwined with the regional economy and society.
• *Segmented areas*, where alongside specialized agriculture other, equally specialized sectors are emerging. Multifunctional land use, rather than multifunctional enterprises, is the distinctive feature.
• "New suburbia", where agriculture is declining and new, often dispersed, settlement patterns are emerging, with commuting providing a major link to urban economies.
• 'Dreamland', characterized by high amenity use but fluctuating popularity, such that it may be determined by highly contingent tendencies.

The emphasis placed on agriculture in this categorisation is helpful as it addresses the question directed earlier towards the Cork Declaration, of what holds rural Europe together if agriculture is discounted; yet at the same time, a typology centred on agriculture may not be appropriate for understanding regional differentiation in the large parts of rural economies and societies that are no longer connected to farming.

In many more cases, research projects have tended to side-step the question of the rural’s spatial relations, accepting rural space as a pre-defined category and selecting geographical case studies as locations for research rather than as objects of enquiry themselves. For example, the RESTRIM project in FP 6 (‘Restructuring in Marginal Rural Areas: the Role of Social Capital in Rural Development’) adopted an empirical focus on peripheral rural areas, with case studies in Finland, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Scotland and Sweden (Árnason et al., 2009). However, as the project leaders acknowledge, their concern was “not so much with the geographical spread” of the case studies, “as with the variety of social networks that are relevant to development in each of them” (ibid., p. 10).

These issues about how the rural is conceptualised in research on rural development matter because they have implications for the extent to which results can be generalised from case studies and claims made for rural Europe as a coherent space. This is an important consideration for DERREG, as is discussed further in the next section.
2.4. Implications for DERREG

The lessons for DERREG from the above review are two-fold. Firstly, contemporary restructuring in rural regions under globalization needs to be put in the context of long-term historic change over the period since the Industrial Revolution. Globalization has not brought sudden, dramatic transformations in rural regions, but is a factor in shaping the latest episode of rural restructuring extending back over a century. This can present problems in terms of isolating contemporary globalization effects from wider background processes. For example, many of our case study areas are located in border regions and businesses in these localities have traded internationally over a number of decades. How, therefore, might we differentiate between established international business links that are the product of earlier industrialization, and new connections that are reflective of contemporary globalization? Unravelling this conundrum requires careful thought about the nature of globalization, as discussed in the next section.

Secondly, if the findings from empirical research in the case study regions are to be extrapolated to produce practical lessons for rural development across Europe as a whole, close attention needs to be paid to the context of the case studies and the extent to which their experiences can be considered as typical of at least groupings of rural regions in Europe. The ten case study regions to be examined in this research were selected to illustrate a range of geographical contexts, from sparsely-populated peripheral locations in Sweden and Ireland to peri-urban districts in Germany (figure 2.4), as well as different economic and demographic characteristics and different histories of support from EU regional development funding. As such, the regions occupy different positions along the continuum from predominantly urban to predominantly rural, and can also be tentatively categorized according to the typology outlined by Van der Ploeg et al. (2008) (table 2.3).
1. Övre Norrland, Sweden  
2. County Roscommon / West Region, Ireland  
3. Alytus county, Lithuania  
4. Comarca de Verin, Spain  
5. Goriška, Slovenia  
6. Pomurska, Slovenia  
7. Jihošlavský kraj, Czech Republic  
8. Westerkwartier, the Netherlands  
9. Direktionsbezirk Dresden, Germany  
10. Saarland, Germany

Figure 2.4: Location of DERREG case study regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Van der Ploeg et al. (2008) typology</th>
<th>Council of Europe/Eurostat Classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Predominantly Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized agricultural areas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peripheral areas</td>
<td>Övre Norrland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alytus county</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comarca de Verin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pomurska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New rural areas</td>
<td>County Roscommon?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segmented areas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New suburbia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dreamland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.3: Categorization of DERREG case study regions by Eurostat classification and Van der Ploeg et al. typology

However, reference to these existing classificatory systems and typologies in itself does little more than demonstrate the diversity of the case study regions. When it comes to understanding observed processes, or predicting which observations may be replicated in other similar regions, it cannot be assumed
that classification systems based on geographical location or the function of agriculture have any causal significance for responses to globalization. As such, the DERREG project needs to develop its own framework for contextualizing the case study research, based on (i) the exposure of regions to globalization impacts; and (ii) the infrastructural capacity of regions that can be mobilized in response to globalization. The contextual reports to be produced for each case study region as Deliverable 5.2 will contribute to the initial analysis and development of this framework, but will need to be revised and refined through the case research itself.
3. Globalization

3.1. Defining Globalization

Globalization is an ambiguous and contested concept. Whilst the term has become widely used, the ways in which it is used, and the precise meanings conveyed by the term, can vary considerably. In some uses, globalization refers to a condition characterized by social, economic, cultural and political interconnection at the global scale in which borders become increasingly irrelevant (Ohmae, 1995); but in other uses it refers to the processes of integration and convergence that lead to this condition (Held et al., 1999). For some, globalization is a force that imposes standardization and conscripts local entities into global networks; for others, it is a discourse that justifies certain actions by interpreting the world as interconnected (Larner, 1998). Globalization is popularly associated with homogenization and standardization (Ritzer, 1993), but critics have argued that it actually proceeds by hybridization, blending different cultures and economic forms to create new global formations (Nederveen Pieterse, 2004). In some analyses, globalization involves the centralization of power, yet in others it is about the diffusion of power in a pervasive but decentred ‘empire’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000). Some commentators place the emphasis on economic globalization, others on cultural globalization, or on political globalization.

These debates concern not only the definition of globalization, but also questions about the inevitability of globalization, the scale of the current extent and impact of globalization, and whether the consequences of globalization are predominantly good or bad. Although varied, the arguments can be distilled into three main positions: the globalist or hyper-globalist approach; the traditionalist or sceptical approach; and the transformationalist approach (el-Ojeili and Hayden, 2006; Murray, 2006). Hyper-globalists (or globalists) see globalization as the natural and unstoppable march of economic integration that has already created a global economy, ushering in a new historical era in which national borders are being dissolved and economic agents organize for competition in the global marketplace. For some hyper-globalists, globalization is a positive force, empowering individuals by spreading capitalism and liberal democracy (Ohmae,
1995), but for others it marks the triumph of oppressive and regressive global capitalism (Peet and Watts, 1993). Traditionalists, or sceptics, in contrast, argue that globalization is not as advanced as hyper-globalists claim and suggest that globalization has been over-hyped in order to support an imperialistic project of capitalist expansion. Traditionalists emphasize the continuing importance of national economies and the national state, and argue that national governments and regional groupings of nations (such as the EU) can regulate global capitalism, with some proposing that it certain respects the world economy has become less integrated (Hirst and Thompson, 1999). Transformationalists steer a middle route, recognizing that new processes of intense integration and interdependence are occurring, and that these are transforming social, economic, cultural and political relations, but arguing that globalization is incomplete and that its outcomes are not pre-determined (Castells, 1996; Giddens, 1990). Moreover, transformationalists position contemporary globalization as the latest stage in a long and dynamic evolutionary process, and acknowledge that it includes both benefits and challenges.

The premise on which DERREG is founded follows a transformationalist approach, recognizing the significant impact of globalization on rural regions in Europe and the challenge presented for regional development, but also proposing that regional actors have the capacity to engage with globalization processes to shape local outcomes. As noted earlier, the core principle underpinning DERREG is that rural regions are proactive regions with the potential to engage constructively with the challenges presented by globalization and to capitalise on the opportunities created.

Moreover, the design of the research not only recognizes that globalization is multi-dimensional, and that these dimensions are inter-connected and inter-dependent, but also that globalization can take different form. It is therefore not a case of choosing between different definitions of globalization as a process, or as a condition, or as a discourse or ideology, but rather one of recognizing that globalization exists in all these forms, and that each can be significant in influencing regional development trajectories. As such, DERREG needs to engage with and examine globalization as a process, as a condition and as a discourse or ideology.
Firstly, to refer to *globalization as a process* is to emphasize the changes that can be observed occurring through which aspects of rural life are being scaled upwards towards the global in terms of their scope, reach and reference points. Steger (2003) describes this understanding of globalization well in his definition, in which “globalization refers to a multidimensional set of social processes that create, multiply, stretch, and intensify worldwide social [and economic] interdependencies and exchanges while at the same time fostering in people a growing awareness of deepening connections between the local and the distant” (p. 13). Breaking down his definition, Steger identifies four qualities that he regards as capturing the essence of globalization. First, globalization “involves the *creation* of new, and the *multiplication* of existing, social networks and activities that increasingly overcome traditional political, economic, cultural, and geographical boundaries” (p. 9). Second, globalization involves the *expansion* and *stretching* of social and economic relations, activities and inter-dependencies over increasing distances. Third, globalization involves the *intensification* and *acceleration* of social exchanges and activities, with connections able to be made across increasing distances in ever-less time and with increasing frequency. Fourth, “the creation, expansion, and intensification of social interconnections and interdependencies do not occur merely on an objective, material level” (p. 12), but also involve the development of a *global consciousness*, in which people have a greater awareness of the world as a whole, and their place in it.

Significantly, globalization understood in this way relates primarily to quantitative and qualitative changes in the form and composition of pre-existing structures, rather than necessarily the creation or imposition of new structures. Take, for example, the trading relationships of a rural business. Most rural businesses will have always had trading relationships that extended beyond their immediate locality, dealing with suppliers based in other regions, and in some cases selling to customers in other regions. Some of these relationships will have always been international, either directly (e.g. producing goods for export), or indirectly (e.g. using natural resources sourced from another country, but obtained through a domestic intermediary). In this instance, therefore, globalization as a process does not refer to the sudden appearance of international trading connections where these did not previously exist, or
necessarily to such relations becoming dominant in a business’s trading profile, but to the incremental movement of a business’s relationships towards greater international engagement and dependency. The evidence for this may include the *multiplication* of trading relationships that are international in nature; the *stretching* of international trading relationships over a greater geographical distance (e.g. exporting products not only to a neighbouring country but to another continent); the *intensification* of international relationships such that they represent a greater volume of trade; and the *acceleration* of international relationships, such that transactions are completed more rapidly, but which in turn increases the exposure of businesses to market changes and other events in other countries. As such, rural businesses may display an enhanced *global consciousness* in their awareness of international markets and fashions.

Similarly, the population of rural communities has always been fluid, with both in-migration and out-migration, and in most communities there have always been cases of individuals who have emigrated to other countries and cases of individuals who have moved in from other countries (either directly or via other localities), as well as residents who have spent time temporarily living abroad, often for work or for military service. Additionally, there is likely to have been residents in rural communities with family or friends living in other countries, and as such a degree of international social connections and consciousness. Thus, again, globalization as a process in this respect does not refer to the sudden appearance of international migration nor to the sudden domination of the rural population by non-nationals, but rather to the growing significance of international movements in migration flows. Evidence of this may include an increase in the number of immigrants moving into a community, or in the number of (permanent and temporary) emigrants from a community, reflecting the *multiplication* and *intensification* of international relationships; as well as the *stretching* of relationships over a greater geographical distance, with, for instance, migrants arriving not only from neighbouring countries but from further afield. The *acceleration* of international connections also may mean that temporary migrants may move more frequently back and forth between different countries, and can retain a virtual presence in the community through internet and communications technologies, hence contributing to an enhanced international *consciousness* in the community.
Secondly, we can also refer to globalization as a condition of inter-connection and inter-dependency between localities around the world. This condition, which is sometimes referred to as ‘globality’ (Steger, 2003), has been identified by some commentators with homogenization and standardization, as in Ritzer’s ‘McDonaldization’ thesis (Ritzer, 1993), however there is sufficient empirical evidence of differential operation of globalization and the resilience of local cultures to suggest that globalization is more correctly characterized by complexity (Urry, 2003). The condition of globalization is manifested in rural localities by the presence of global actors such as transnational corporations or organizations, or immigrants or imported technologies, as well as through networks that connect rural localities to distant localities through trade, travel and consumption. The presence of global actors and networks is not sufficiently uniform or universal to produce homogenization, but the presence of any global actor or link to any global network will change a locality. As the concentration of global actors and networks increases (as globalization as process progresses), so the impact will become more pronounced.

However, globalization as a condition is also significant for its indirect effects. The condition of globalization forms the context in which rural localities now exist, and for all changes occurring within them. For example, the disappearance of small family farms is part of an historical trajectory that is associated with the industrialization of agriculture, however many farms struggling to survive in the early twenty-first century have been tipped over the edge by the pressures of international competition in agricultural markets, the restructuring of subsidies linked to global trade agreements, or the impact of recession in distant countries on key export markets. Similarly, the development of renewable energy projects in rural localities may be part of the diversification of a regional economy, supported by regional or national government policy, and aimed at supplying domestic energy markets, but they take place in the context of global consciousness about climate change, and form part of a global industry in which, for instance, the supply of key components is internationalized.

Both the direct and indirect effects of globalization as a condition can influence strategies for rural regional development. Regional development strategies may
target the direct manifestations of globalization as a condition, by seeking to
exploit or develop global networks such as business relationships or tourism
flows, or to attract investment from transnational corporations, or secure
international environmental designations awarded by supranational bodies as an
anticipated catalyst for eco-tourism and sustainable development. Yet, the
indirect effects of globalization as a condition can be equally important in setting
parameters for local action. For example, a regeneration strategy based on
manufacturing to supply consumer goods to a domestic market is likely to be
unsuccessful in a global market dominated by cheap imports from East Asia,
unless a particular specialist niche can be identified. Similarly, development
projects involving disruption to internationally-recognized natural environments,
such as new roads or mining, are unlikely to go uncontested given levels of
international environmental consciousness and the global reach of environmental
NGOs.

Thirdly, consideration also needs to be given to globalization as a discourse,
or as an interpretative framework. At one level this includes the ideology of
‘globalism’, which promotes free trade, the eradication of national boundaries
and the development of a global economy and a global culture as being
inherently good (Steger, 2003). This ideological position, which is associated with
neoliberal politics, is not necessarily widely held, but has been influential in
certain policy areas, particularly international trade.

More broadly, globalization as a discourse provides a way of understanding
contemporary social and economic changes that is increasingly commonly used
by governmental and non-governmental actors at all levels. A notable application
of this critique was employed by Larner (1998) in relation to 1990s New Zealand.
There, Larner argues, a globalization discourse was hegemonic in government
thinking, treating the ‘reality’ of globalization as taken-for-granted and
suggesting that the New Zealand economy needed to be interpreted in terms of
its readiness to engage with the global economy, and came to drive economic
policy and was used to justify wide-ranging deregulation and economic and
political reforms.
The articulation of a globalization discourse is also evident, more subtly, in many rural and regional development strategies. Assumptions about the form of globalization, its inevitability, its challenges and its opportunities are drawn on in the formulation and implementation of regional development strategies, shaping, for example, decisions about which economic sectors to prioritize for development and the skills that local workers need. Yet, these assumptions are frequently based on generalised assertions about globalization and higher-level analysis, not on grounded observations about the actual effects of globalization in the region concerned. As such, regional development strategies can be informed more by perceptions about globalization than by actual globalization impacts. For instance, globalization is popularly associated with the ubiquity of communications technologies producing time-space compression, which is often further perceived to erode the geographical disadvantages of peripheral rural regions. This perception, in turn, can encourage the assumption that rural regions are able to compete in the global economy on equal terms with urban regions, leading to policies that emphasize the development of hi-tech industries or global service centres. However, such policies may neglect or underestimate the significance of other political, cultural, structural or labour market factors which may continue to disadvantage the region concerned and limit the effectiveness of the programmes adopted.

3.2. Globalization and Rural Regions
As noted above, globalization is multidimensional, involving parallel transformations across the domains of economic, social, cultural, political and environmental activity. Each of these dimensions of globalization can impact on rural regions -- though with differing degrees of emphasis in different localities -- such that arguably no aspect of rural life is wholly immune from the influence of globalization. The different strands of globalization exist autonomously, but are frequently inter-connected or entwined. Thus, as will be argued further below, rural regions tend to experience globalization as a multi-faceted phenomenon, with social, economic, political and cultural effects. However, research on globalization by rural social scientists has tended to be segmented, focusing on specific globalization processes, specific global networks, or specific outcomes (Woods, 2007b). Accordingly, the evidence base for understanding the impacts
of globalization in rural regions is less comprehensive and less holistic than it is for many urban regions, reinforcing the bias observed by Hogan (2004) that “there is a discernable privileging of urban over rural in scholarly accounts of globalization” (p. 22).

This section briefly reviews the existing evidence base on the impacts of globalization in rural Europe and summarises the key globalization processes relevant to rural regions. In keeping with the structure of academic research in this area, the review first focuses on the economic, social/demographic, and cultural/political dimensions of globalization independently, and then considers the limited evidence available on the combined effect of these processes in the restructuring of rural localities.

3.2.1 Economic Globalization

Most rural studies of globalization to date have focused on economic globalization, or the position of rural areas in the growth of an integrated global economy. There are several different but interconnected elements to economic globalization, each impacting on the functioning of rural economies. The first of these is the liberalization of trade and the promotion of the global marketplace, which represents an example of globalization involving the gradual stretching of relations over time and space. For most rural regions in Europe, exposure to international free trade was first significantly experienced as a result of the dismantling of trade barriers within the European Economic Community (later the European Union), and the move towards a Single European Market. More recently, the EU has entered into free trade agreements with other states and blocs, liberalizing its own trade policies as part of the broader movement towards global free trade promoted by the World Trade Organization (WTO).

The consequence for businesses in rural regions is that they face increased competition for domestic markets, but also are presented with new opportunities for export. In many sectors, European producers have struggled to compete with goods from countries where production and labour costs are lower, especially the newly industrializing nations of Asia. This is particularly true for manufacturing, especially for industries such as clothing that have traditionally had a strong presence in rural regions, although there are also differential trends within
Europe with rural regions in southern and eastern Europe gaining from the relocation of industries from more expensive regions in northern and western Europe (Kalantaridis, 2005).

However, it is the liberalization of agricultural trade that is the most totemic and controversial change for most rural regions. Even within the European Union, the liberalization of trade in agricultural products between member states has been contested by farmer protests in several countries. Nonetheless internal trade in agricultural products in western Europe was worth over US$174.2 billion by 2001, or around 22% of global agricultural trade (Millstone and Lang, 2003). The EU is perceived as relatively protectionist in terms of global trade in agricultural products, but has been compelled to liberalize trade regulations through successive rounds of WTO negotiations. Consequentially, imports of food, drink and tobacco products into the EU increased by 59% between 1999 and 2008, and imports of raw materials increased by 94% (table 3.1). This has heightened competition for European farmers in domestic markets, but some sectors have gained from new export opportunities. Indeed, exports of food, drink and tobacco products from the EU increased by 64% between 1999 and 2008, and exports of raw materials by 124%. Thus, whilst the EU has a net trade deficit in agricultural products overall, the underlying picture is a more complex dynamic of intensified trade volumes with differing balances of trade across different sectors and with respect to different global partners (table 3.2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Food, Drink &amp; Tobacco</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>50.31</td>
<td>58.10</td>
<td>57.33</td>
<td>63.01</td>
<td>75.59</td>
<td>80.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>41.82</td>
<td>49.30</td>
<td>48.53</td>
<td>52.00</td>
<td>62.02</td>
<td>68.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Raw Materials</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>38.91</td>
<td>48.04</td>
<td>43.09</td>
<td>52.71</td>
<td>70.47</td>
<td>75.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>14.48</td>
<td>16.95</td>
<td>18.27</td>
<td>23.80</td>
<td>30.79</td>
<td>32.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1: Extra-EU27 trade in agriculture-related products, 1999-2008, in billion Euro (Source: Eurostat).

1 'Food, drink and tobacco products' include food (prepared and unprepared), live animals, beverages and tobacco; 'raw materials' include crude materials except fuels, such as hides, skins, cork, wood, pulp and textile fibres, and animal and vegetable fats and oils.
The second key element of economic globalization is the development of global commodity chains, in which a commodity may be produced in one country, traded in a second, processed in a third, and sold in a fourth. Developed by Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994), the commodity chain concept is designed as means of mapping the complexities of the global economy, and includes analysis of the flow of commodities between different nodes in the chains (e.g. the site of production and the site of retail sale), the utilization of labour at each node, the mode of production employed at each node, and the geographical location of each node. With globalization, the nodes in a commodity chain have become more geographically dispersed, but the map of commodity chains has also become more open to sudden reconfiguration as sites of production or processing are shifted for economic gain (e.g. see Barrett et al., 1999, on horticulture).

The globalization of commodity chains is hence manifested not only in the displacement of European rural regions as suppliers of food and other resources to European markets, but also in the distortion of supply chains between European producers and European consumers, and in the changing function of processing industries in rural regions. Similarly, a food processing plant historically located in a rural region for proximity to a supply of raw materials, may now source the same raw materials globally. Manufacturing enterprises that remain in rural regions adopt specialist functions in a longer and geographically stretched chain of production.
However, the commodity chain approach has been critiqued as an analytical device from a number of perspectives. Dicken et al. (2001), for example, have argued that the commodity chain model over-emphasizes linearity and the power of transnational corporations, and have promoted a more post-structuralist-influenced engagement with networks rather than chains. Meanwhile, a number of researchers, particularly within development studies and including Gereffi et al. (2005), have expanded the global commodity chain model into the concept of ‘global value chains’, intended to go beyond a focus on intra-firm supply chains and product flows to adopt a more holistic political-economic analysis of the governance of commodity networks and the interaction of key actors at the global scale (Stamm, 2008). At the same time, empirical studies of agri-food commodity chains by Ilbery and Maye (2008) in Britain and Kulke (2008) in Germany and Poland, have highlighted the continuing importance of regional institutional structures and supply networks in European agri-food commodity chains.

The third element of economic globalization is corporate concentration and the consolidation of transnational corporations and corporate alliances with interests spanning different countries, different sectors and/or different functions in the commodity chain. Corporate concentration is increasingly a feature of many key traditional rural industries in Europe, including forestry, mining and quarrying, energy production and viticulture (Gabel and Bruner, 2003). In the agri-food sector, the global seed market is dominated by four transnational corporations (Monsanto, Syngenta, DuPont, and Aventis), whilst 90% of the wheat and corn trade in the EU is controlled by five global conglomerates, including Cargill (US-based), Continental Grain (US), Bunge (Argentina), Dreyfus-ADM (France/US) and André Garnac (Swiss) (Gabel and Bruner, 2003). Food processing and marketing is similarly dominated by a cluster of transnational corporations operating at a global scale, including European companies Sodhexho Alliance (France), Groupe Danone (France), Montedison (Italy), Unilever (Netherlands) and Nestlé (Switzerland) (Gabel and Bruner, 2003).

Moreover, transnational corporate concentration in the agri-food sector has been reinforced by the forging of strategic alliances between companies operating in
different parts of the commodity chain to form expansive ‘food chain clusters’ (Hendrickson and Heffernan, 2002), which aim to stretch from ‘seed to shelf’, in the slogan of the US conglomerate ConAgra. Food retailing is also experiencing corporate consolidation, with major supermarket chains such as Carrefour (France), Tesco (UK), Auchan (Netherlands), Aldi (Germany) and ITM (France) not only occupying dominant positions in domestic retail markets, but also increasingly operating internationally. Carrefour, for example, is not only the largest retailer in France, but also in Spain, Portugal, Greece and Belgium. In the Czech Republic, 65% of food retailing is controlled by foreign supermarket groups, as is 64% of food retailing in Hungary (table 3.3). Moreover, just as the American supermarket giant Wallmart has established a presence in European countries including Britain and Germany, European supermarket chains including Ahold, Carrefour, Marko and Tesco have become major players in Latin America and south east Asia (Hendrickson and Heffernan, 2002; IfL, 2005; Millstone and Lang, 2003).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Supermarket Groups and Nationality (in order of market share)</th>
<th>Share of food retail trade 2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Metro (D), Ahold (NL), Schwarz (Lidl) (D), Rewe (D), Tesco (UK)</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Metro (D), Tesco (UK), Louis Delhaize (B), Tengelmann (D), Rewe (D)</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Ahold (NL), VP Market (LT), Reitan (N), Kesko (SF), Rautakirja (SF)</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Metro (D), Jeronimo Martins (P), Auchan (F), Casino (F)</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Kesko (SF), Rautakirja (SF), Reitan (N), SOK (SF), Ahold (NL)</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Tesco (UK), Metro (D), Rewe (D), Schwarz (Lidl) (D), Carrefour (F)</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Mercator (SI), Spar (A), Leclerc (F), Tengelmann (D)</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>VP Market (LT), IKE (LT), Ahold (NL), Reitan (N), Kesko (SF)</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3: Share of food retail market held by transnational supermarket groups in central and eastern European countries (Source: IfL, 2005).

The implications of transnational corporate concentration for rural economies are several-fold. Corporate concentration gives tremendous sway over market conditions and prices to a small clique of companies, and those operating through food-chain clusters at several parts of the commodity chain can exert pressure on producers as both suppliers and purchasers. Moreover, major
corporations in food processing or retailing (including ‘fast-food’ chains such as McDonald as well as supermarkets), can shape the conditions and processes of productions by imposing common standards. As such Van der Ploeg (2006) contends that, “globalization occurs not through the internationalized flows of commodities, ideas and people, but through the subordination and consequent reorganization of local and regional farming systems to just one grammar, that is, the one entailed in, and imposed by, the increasingly inter-locking socio-technical regimes” (p. 261).

At the same time, transnational corporations exercise power by trading suppliers and regions off against each other in the search for lower production costs, such that investment in specific regions may be transitory. Van der Ploeg (2008), for example, describes the strategy of the now-defunct Italian food conglomerate, Parmalat, in shifting the sourcing of milk from Italy to Germany to France to Poland in its bid to increase profit margins. New technologies have enabled even sectors dealing with perishable products such as dairying to become footloose industries, permitting corporate practices in which the traceability of a product becomes obscured, referring “only to abstract origins, which might today be in China, tomorrow in Poland, while yesterday, for example, it was located in Peru” (Van der Ploeg, 2008, p. 107). Corporations may equally use their dominance within certain regions to effect structural changes that create the conditions to facilitate international market expansion. The controversial investment of US conglomerate Smithfield Foods in Poland, for example, is alleged to follow this model, with an aggressive acquisition campaign leading to their domination of Polish pig farming, creating leverage that has been used to lobby for legislative and structural changes that will embed Poland as a low-cost environment from which Smithfield can bid to control the European pork products market (The Ecologist, December 2003). Corporate globalization is hence associated with spatial selectivity in production and sourcing as with brand ubiquity in consumption.

The introduction of transnational corporations into rural regions is not always predatory. Inward investment has often been actively encouraged as part of regional development strategies, especially in the manufacturing and hi-tech sectors. Inglis (2008) describes the example of the establishment of a factory for
the Japanese electronics company, NEC, in a village in rural Ireland, with support and encouragement from the Irish government. As Inglis records, the factory transformed local employment opportunities and brought considerable material benefits to the community, contributing €600 million to the local economy over 30 years. Yet, he also notes more contentious social and cultural effects of the firm’s presence, as well as the vulnerability resulting from the loss of control to corporate bosses in Japan. NEC Ireland was, he observes, in effect competing with other NEC subsidiaries around the world, and the factory was closed in 2006 with the loss of over 300 jobs “because workers in Singapore, Malaysia and China were able to produce more for less” (Inglis, 2008, p. 218).

The fourth and final element of economic globalization is the formation of a new global property regime, resulting from a combination of the liberalization of restrictions on the movement of capital, liberalized property laws and the privatization of state-owned natural resources. This includes transnational corporate ownerships of forests, agricultural land, mines and water resources, as well as investment in vineyards, tourist resorts and renewable energy sites. Western agri-food companies and investment funds secured large areas of privatized collective farmland in central and eastern Europe following the collapse of communism, and continue to do so. In 2008, 128,000 hectares of farmland in Russia were bought by Swedish company Alpcot Agro, whilst the US bank Morgan Stanley bought 40,000 hectares of land in Ukraine in March 2009 (The Economist, 21 May 2009). Yet, investment is not limited to large corporations. Schmied (2005) notes that farmers from France, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands bought farms in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland where, prior to EU enlargement in 2004, they were able to benefit from the combination of EU financial support through the PHARE programme, but fewer regulations than within the EU (see also Flochlay, 2001).

Other transnational property purchases have been made for reasons of amenity use, or social status. A number of former aristocratic estates in the Scottish Highlands, for example, have been purchased by overseas buyers, such that by the mid 1990s there were sixteen foreign landowners holding estates of more than 4,000 acres in rural Scotland, including a Malaysian investor with 70,000 acres and an Arab Sheikh with 63,000 acres (Cramb, 2000). Several of these
transactions have been contested by local residents, and Mackenzie (2006) presents the community buy-out of the North Harris Estate, previously owned by a Swiss industrialist, in 2003 as a disruption to narratives of enclosure and privatization promoted by neoliberal globalization.

3.2.2 The Globalization of Mobility
If economic globalization may be understood in terms of the increased mobility of capital and commodities within a global economy, the second key dimension of globalization for rural regions relates to the increase mobility of people facilitated by advances in transport and communications technology and the liberalization of travel and immigration controls. Here again, globalization is best understood not as the creation of new structures, but as the multiplication, intensification and stretching of existing networks and processes. Many of the individual elements that contribute to the globalization of mobility – tourism, amenity migration, counterurbanization, labour migration – have been present within countries and between neighbouring countries for several decades. However, over the last 25 years the networks associated with these processes have been stretched over greater distances across the globe, intensifying in volume and engaging a greater number of localities.

The globalization of tourism, for example, has seen the total number of international tourist trips increase from 536 million in 1995, to 903 million in 2007 (World Tourism Organization, 2008). Five of the top ten destinations for international tourists are in the EU, and international tourist arrivals to countries in Europe increased from just over 300 million 1995 to close to 500 million in 2007 (World Tourism Organization, 2008). The volume of international tourism that is targeted at rural regions is difficult to quantify, but local studies and anecdotal evidence point to international visitors being significant in tourism in several rural regions of Europe, including the Scottish Highlands, Tuscany, many parts of rural France and rural Ireland, and the Alpine regions. In south-eastern Ireland, for instance, international visitors are reported to constitute just over half of all tourist visits (Woods, 2007a).

All forms of international tourism have social and cultural impacts on the localities concerned, both positive and negative, and these are arguably
intensified in communities that have attracted concentrations of second homes or holiday homes (see Gallent et al., 2005; Müller, 2002). Ownership of rural second homes has been a relatively strong tradition in some parts of Europe, notably Sweden, France, Spain and the Czech Republic but confined within the country (Gallent et al., 2005; Schmied, 2005). There are also historic patterns of relatively small-scale second home ownership by Germans in southern Sweden and the Languedoc coast of France, and by Britons in the Dordogne and Perigord regions of France (Gallent et al., 2005).

Gallent et al. (2005) show that rates of second home ownership increased significantly in many European countries in the 1980s and 1990s and suggest much of the increase has been constituted by purchase of holiday homes abroad. Schmied (2005) similarly notes that “the average ‘acceptable’ distance between first and second home has been increasing and many second homes are owned by non-nationals, sometimes intermingled with house owned by nationals, sometimes regionally more separated” (p. 153). The expansion of cheap air travel across Europe has assisted this process, especially for areas where depopulation has generated a surplus in the rural housing stock available for adaptation.

The largest concentrations of second homes, both domestic- and foreign- owned, continue to be in traditional areas such as the Provence, Dordogne, Languedoc, Brittany and Normandy in France; inland Spain; Tuscany and the Swedish coast. As table 3.4 shows, there are large numbers of German-owned second homes in all of these countries, whilst figures suggest that there are more than 200,000 British-owned second homes in France (Gallent et al., 2005). Yet, there is also evidence that the geographical spread of second homes has expanded. Gallent et al. (2005) observe that German ownership of second homes in Sweden began to increase sharply in the early 1990s, with 4,000 properties purchased between 1991 and 1996, but as Pettersson (1999) demonstrates this trend also involved an extension in the range of locations from Skåne to more northern regions, including the DERREG case study region of Övre Norrland (table 3.5) (see also Müller, 2002). Schmied similarly notes the expansion of non-national second home purchases in parts of central and eastern Europe, notably around Lake Balaton in Hungary, and in Istria in Croatia (see Brittner-Widmann, 2006).
Spain 300,000
France 100,000
Italy 80,000
Portugal 65,000
Sweden 5,500

Table 3.4: German-owned second homes in selected countries, 2001
(Source: Folkesdotter, 2003; Gallent et al., 2005)

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<td>11</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>51</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>157</td>
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Table 3.5: Purchases of second homes in Västerbotten and Norrbotten (Övre Norrland) by non-Swedish nationals, 1990-96.
(Source: Pettersson, 1999)

A related trend is the expansion of transnational amenity migration on a permanent basis, which has often targeted the same regions as second home purchases. This trend may arguably be positioned as part of the broader process of counter-urbanization, with studies of international amenity migrants highlighting the perceived attraction of the ‘rural idyll’ as a key factor alongside factors such as climate and cost of living (Buller and Hoggart, 1994; King et al., 2000). With encouragement from television programmes and magazines, and assistance from specialist real estate agencies, urban residents seeking to quit the city have made choices to move not to rural regions in their own country, but to perceived bucolic regions elsewhere in Europe. There is also an element of rural-to-rural migration by individuals who consider rural areas of countries such as Britain and the Netherlands to have become too urbanized. As a reflection of these cultural preferences, the key destination regions include parts of rural France, Andalusia and Catalonia in Spain, Tuscany in Italy, and the west of Ireland, whilst the major source countries are Britain, Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands (King et al., 2000; Schmied, 2005). There is also emerging
Evidence of international amenity migration into some rural regions in central and eastern Europe (IPPR, 2007).

Other forms of migration have also contributed to the growing cultural diversity of rural regions. Direct non-European immigration into rural regions continues to be relatively limited compared with immigration to urban areas, but some rural regions have been selected for the resettlement of refugees. As Brekke (2008) describes for northern Norway, the ‘incomplete circle’ of refugee migration complicates their migration history and opportunities, and many refugees are not integrated with their host regions, with Brekke showing that new technologies help them to retain close links with their home countries. Furthermore, in some regions plans for asylum processing centres in rural localities have been fiercely contested by local residents, concerned at a perceived disruption to the ‘rural idyll’ (Hubbard, 2005).

More significant is the increased volume of labour migration. In contrast to the United States, the extensive use of non-national migrant labour in the European rural economy is a relatively recent phenomenon, which has expanded to fill a labour vacuum in industries such as horticulture and food packaging created by depeasantization and the enhanced social mobility of rural residents. In fact, there are arguably two distinct circuits of international labour migration operating through rural Europe.

The first is the employment of migrant workers from Latin America and Africa in rural regions of Spain, Italy and Greece (and to a lesser extent, Germany), primarily in agriculture (Hoggart and Mendoza, 1999; Kasimis et al., 2003). Hoggart and Mendoza (1999), for example, reported that migrant African workers comprised more than 5 per cent of the agricultural workforce in the three Spanish provinces of Murcia, Almeria and Cáceres in 1995, and that 32 per cent of African migrant workers in Spain were employed in agriculture. There is evidence that the numbers of both documented and undocumented non-European migrant workers in southern Europe have increased over the last decade, with newspaper reports in 2006, for instance, describing the thousands of undocumented temporary agricultural workers in the Italian province of Calabria that have come from African countries including Tunisia, Morocco,
Egypt, Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Mali, Togo, Eritrea and Sudan (Lawrence, 2006; Woods, 2007a).

The second circuit is that produced by the accession of central and eastern European states (the A8 states) to the EU in 2004, which was followed by the large-scale movement of migrant workers to the west, particularly to countries in north-western Europe such as Britain, Ireland and Sweden where no additional restrictions were imposed on the employment opportunities of A8 migrant workers. A significant proportion of A8 migrant workers moved into rural regions in these countries (Jentsch, 2007), with many working in agriculture, food-processing, manufacturing and hospitality (CRC, 2007; Mac Éinri, 2007; Woods and Watkin, 2008). This has meant that many central and eastern European migrant workers moved into small towns and villages with little or no history of immigration, with the inevitable consequence that cultural tensions have been reported in a number of communities, especially those where the migrant population is dominated by young men (CRC, 2007; Woods and Watkin, 2008).

In their work on Latino migrant labour in the southern United States, Torres et al. (2006) suggest that a ‘silent bargain’ has been struck in which rural communities accept cultural difference because of the economic contribution of migrant workers, and migrants accept poor pay and work conditions in return for a trouble-free presence. It is arguable that a similar accommodation has been implicitly reached in many rural areas hosting migrant labour, with the consequence that comparatively low pay, restrictive working conditions and poor housing are widely accepted for migrant workers by both rural communities and migrant workers (Rogaly, 2006; Rye and Andrzejewska, 2009).

Torres et al. (2006) also speculate about the emergence of a ‘rural cosmopolitanism’ in the southern United States, where different cultural practices are worked out alongside each other by national and migrant groups. This process is arguably less advanced in Europe, though there are some emerging examples, for instance, the small town of Gort in western Ireland, with a sizeable community of Brazilian immigrants, initially recruited to work in meat factories. Dean (2008) describes the Brazilian food store, adverts for local events in Portuguese, and claims that “although some language difficulties remain, the
Brazilian migrants are highly integrated, as everything from cooking, dancing and language tips are exchanged between the various members of the community” (p 139). Skaptadóttir and Wojtynska (2008), have similarly suggested that the presence of Polish migrant workers has converted fishing villages in Iceland into multicultural ‘postnational zones’ (Appadurai, 1996), or “spaces where people of different origins meet, compete and negotiate their place” (Skaptadóttir and Wojtynska, 2008, p. 119), yet they also note that the migrant workers tend to lead ‘dichotomized lives’ structured by a ‘bifocal’ view of place, in which the host community is associated with work and the home community with leisure and identity.

A significant proportion of labour migration from central and eastern Europe to north western Europe appears to be rural-rural migration. Whilst geographical origins of migrant workers have not been quantifying at the regional scale, available evidence suggests that international labour migration is a factor in the negative migration balance of many rural regions in central and eastern Europe (c.f. figure 2.3). As such, international labour migration is likely to contribute in these regions to problems of a declining population base to support services, shortages of skilled workers and an aging population profile, although studies exploring these anticipated impacts in situ are limited.

However, the new wave of labour migration from central and eastern Europe has been distinguished by the strength of connections that are maintained to home communities. Research by the Wales Rural Observatory, for example, has shown that around two-thirds of migrant workers in rural Wales had made visits home, often frequently (Woods and Watkin, 2008), and similar ties have been observed for Polish migrant workers in Ireland and Iceland (Kropiwiec and King-O’Rian, 2006; Skaptadóttir and Wojtynska, 2008). As such, central and eastern European migrant workers in north western Europe could be positioned as forming ‘transnational communities’ that transgress established spatial categories, existing “like quantum particles in two places at once” (Davis, 2000, p. 77; see also, Faist, 2000; Levitt, 2001; Urry, 2003). Skaptadóttir and Wojtynska (2008), for example, suggest that “transnational/translocal practices and networking tie migrants to two places: that of their country of origin and that of their destination” (p. 124), with migrants following a ‘mobile livelihood’,
“working in Iceland in order to create a better life back home” (ibid.). Accordingly, they argue that “notions of ‘migrant labour’ and ‘immigrant integration’ do not adequately capture the very complex ways in which [migrant workers] are situated” (ibid.).

As implied above, a further characteristic of labour migration from central and eastern Europe is that it is often intended to be short-term. Only around a fifth of migrant workers surveyed in Wales by the Wales Rural Observatory intended to stay in Britain for five years or more (the perceptions and aspirations of this group often correlated with those of domestic rural in-migrants, such that they might be positioned as part of transnational counter-urbanization), with the majority of migrant workers intending to return home after short periods of work abroad as experience around university studies or to earn money to support families at home (Woods and Watkin, 2008). Similar observations have been made in Iceland, Ireland and Norway (Skaptadóttir and Wojtynska, 2008; Mac Éinrí, 2007; Rye and Andrzejewska, 2009), and seem to be supported by the reported decreased in central and eastern European migrant workers registered in Britain in 2008 and 2009.

Once again, little evidence is available as to whether migrant workers are returning to their home communities and regions, or moving to cities in their home countries, or even to other foreign locations, however, there does appear to be a potential opportunity for rural regions in central and eastern Europe to benefit not only from the investment of foreign earnings by migrant workers, but also from their international experience and connections. Gaddesfors and Cronsell (2009) suggest that return migrants (both domestic and international) are uniquely positioned in their capacity for entrepreneurial activity in rural regions, with an advantage over other external investors “when it comes to local knowledge of all kinds, such as whom to talk to, finding your way around, weather conditions, local history, local stakeholders’ capacity, etc.” (p. 1199). They argue that the returnee status helped to reduce the suspicion of local stakeholders towards new ideas, but also noted that it could also create complications in relationships between returnee entrepreneurs and local business partners. Ní Laoire (2007), similarly highlights the complex process of adaptation experienced by return migrants to rural Ireland from Britain and the United
States, including the ‘culture shock’ of return and the ambiguous position of being both an incomer and a local. As such, return migration can present both economic opportunities and social challenges for rural regions.

3.2.3 The Globalization of Values

The third key dimension of globalization for rural regions concerns the growth of a global consciousness, facilitated by cultural globalization and incorporating a ‘globalization of values’. By the ‘globalization of values’ I am referring to the assertion that particular rights, beliefs, standards and values are universal and should be applied and adhered to across the world, regardless of cultural difference and local tradition. This process is perhaps most prominent with respect to ideas about human rights and women’s rights, but in the context of rural regions it is particularly significant in terms of animal welfare and environmental protection.

The starting point for the globalization of values in animal welfare and environmental protection has been the discursive construction of a singular ‘global nature’, which Urry (2003) identifies as a prime example of globalization as performance:

“\textit{What were once many apparently separate activities are now regarded as interconnected components of a single global crisis of the natural world … This global nature has resulted from fusing various social practices that are remaking space. These include images of the earth from space and especially the Apollo 17 photograph of the ‘whole earth’ taken in 1972, transport policies, deforestation, energy use, media images of threatened iconic environments which are often markets of global threats, dramatic environmental protest, scientific papers on climate change, the ending of the cold war, NGO campaigns, records of extreme weather events, pronouncements by global public figures, global conferences such as Rio and Kyoto, and so on. Together these practices are performing a ‘global nature’, a nature that appears to be undergoing change that needs to be vigorously and systematically resisted and indeed reversed.” (Urry, 2003, pp 6-7).
Global consciousness of nature has been forged through the circulation of images and representations of nature through the increasingly globalized media. This includes natural history programmes, traded and transmitted internationally (the BBC’s *Planet Earth* series had been broadcast in over 130 countries (Plentl, 2007)), as well as representations of nature, wildlife, farming and environmental problems in adult and childrens’ literature, film, television drama, and so on (see Phillips, 2008). By detaching representations of nature from their geographical context, such media portrayals encourage the blending and blurring of images to produce a discursive global nature, as making audiences familiar with rural spaces that are geographically distant to them, and promoting ways of interpreting environmental practices that bypass traditional embedded regional cultures and folk knowledges.

The globalized consciousness of nature subsequently feeds into the actions of environmental and animal welfare NGOs that operate transnationally, such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, PETA and IFAW, and into international treaties and agreements. In a rural context, the implementation of international agreements and campaigning by international NGOs has produced conflicts over issues including animal husbandry practices (for example associated with the production of speciality regional food such as foie gras), the live transport of farm animals, traditions such as bull-running and bull-fighting, and hunting, where new globalized values have collided with traditional rural discourses of nature and practices. Alphandéry and Fortier (2001), for example, discuss problems involved with the top-down implementation of the Natura 2000 framework in France, introduced as part of the EU’s international biodiversity obligations, which contributed to a brief flowering of support for the *Chasse, Pêche, Nature et Tradition* (CPNT) party in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

Tensions can also arise between the imperatives of economic globalization and the globalization of values, where projects aimed at economic development are challenged on environmental grounds. An example in Europe is the upgrading of the Via Baltica transnational motorway through Poland and the Baltic States, as part of an enhancement of the Trans-European Transport Network aimed at stimulating economic development in the Baltic region. The proposed route has been strongly opposed by international NGOs, including WWF and BirdLife.
International, because of its environmental impact and particularly its infringement of Natura 2000 designated wetlands. Campaigns by NGOs have combined local site protests with demonstrations and lobbying at EU level, this connecting a local conflict with broader ‘global’ environmental concerns (Fuller, 2009).

Conversely, discursive representations of climate change as a global environmental problem have been mobilized to support renewable energy projects, such as the installation of wind turbine power stations, sometimes in opposition to local resistance to projects based on local discourses of nature and landscape (Woods, 2003).

### 3.3. Globalization and Time-Space-Compression

The three dimensions of globalization discussed above all reflect, and contribute to time-space compression, or the annihilation of space through time (Harvey, 1989; see also Murray, 2006). For Harvey, the annihilation of space through time has always been a central dynamic for capitalism, striving for the eradication of the costs and obstacles associated with distance to speed up the circuit of capital, but he argues that the post-modern period has involved an intensification of the process with far-reaching transformative effects: “we have been experiencing, these last two decades, an intense phase of time-space compression that has had a disorienting and disruptive impact upon political-economic practices, the balance of class power, as well as upon social and cultural life” (Harvey, 1989, p 284).

It is this intense time-space compression that marks out the contemporary experience of globalization from previous globalization waves. Rural areas in Europe have been subject to global influences, and tied into global networks, for many centuries: they have produced minerals and raw materials for distant markets; been transformed by the introduction of exotic crops and livestock breeds; suffered from mass emigration to populate new colonies and regions; and, in coastal regions, supplied crews for merchant navies. Yet, most rural communities continued to be sheltered by distance and poor accessibility, with the impact of global events and processes slowed and diluted. Contemporary
globalization, in contrast, is characterized by the *totality of its reach* and the *immediacy of the connections* established.

Some commentators have interpreted these developments as the smoothing out of geographical inequalities to create a ‘flat world’ with a truly global economy (e.g. Friedman, 2005). Globalization, and particularly the ubiquity of a global IT and communications infrastructure, are argued to have liberated rural areas from the tyranny of the space-economy. As Howard Newby put it in a British newspaper interview in the 1980s:

"for the first time since the industrial revolution, technological change is allowing rural areas to compete on an equal basis with towns and cities for employment.” (Newby quoted in *The Financial Times*, 8 December, 1989, quoted by Marsden et al., 1993, p 2)

This idea continues to have a powerful influence in rural development discourse, but its simplicity is exposed by empirical evidence. Distance still matters for many economic activities, from agriculture to tourism; geographical differences in natural environment, climate, social structure, political structures, demographic profile, labour market composition and skills base, culture, and so on, do influence the capacity of a region to compete. Even the spread of information technology is spatially uneven, with many rural areas having poorer access to infrastructure such as broadband than urban counterparts.

Thus, globalization has not fused core and periphery, but has re-ordered space to produce new meanings of centrality and peripherality, and, indeed, new meanings for spatial relations more broadly. Massey (2005), in developing the argument that “space cannot be annihilated by time” (p 90), attacks the popular aphorisms that “there is no longer any distinguishing between near and far” and “that the margins have invaded the centre” (p 92). Rather, she proposes that,

"The argument here is simply that what is, or should be, at issue in accounts of modernity and of globalisation (and indeed in the construction/conceptualisation of space in general) is not a kind of denuded spatial form in itself (distance; the degree of openness; the number of
interconnections; proximity, etc. etc.), but the relational content of that spatial form and in particular the nature of the embedded power-relations. There is no mechanical correlation between distance and difference ... space is more than distance. Location, confinement, symbolism [have] played their roles too. What is at issue is the articulation of forms of power within spatial configurations.” (Massey, 2005, p 93)

The concept of peripherality is hence not solely about linear distance from a presumptive ‘core’, but also about positionality and engagement in a complex entanglement of networks and connections, about participation in consumer culture, about political power and influence, about opportunities for escape, about the symbolism of place, and the identity construction of local residents. Bærenholdt and Granås (2008), in the introduction to a collection on ‘Northern European Peripheries’, draw on Massey to present ‘peripheral’ localities in northern Europe as ‘thrown together’ places, in which “social scapes are enacted across distinctions such as periphery-centre, local-global and so on” (Bærenholdt and Granås, 2008, p 1). As contributions to the volume demonstrate, peripherality is not a fixed condition, but is contested, re-imagined, re-centred, articulated, claimed and rejected through the practices and representations of local and non-local actors working through place.

Observations such as these emphasize the importance of developing our understanding of how globalization actually works in situ to restructure and reconstitute place, and particularly of how different strands of globalization come together, in concert or in opposition. In urban studies, the concept of the ‘global city’ has provided a framework for exploring these entangled processes in the setting of major agglomerations, but there is a dearth of place-based studies of globalization in rural studies. As argued in Woods (2007b), this omission means that our mosaic of understanding of globalization in a rural context continues to be only partially developed:

"the mosaic remains very much a work in progress. Some parts of the picture are considerably clearer and more complete than others; some studies sit as isolated tiles, apart from the emerging tessellation; and the connections between some parts of the image and other parts are as yet
unknown. In particular, the mosaic is missing the input of a substantial body of place-based studies – research that might not only adopt an integrated perspective in examining the impact of different forms and aspects of globalization in a rural locality, but that might also explore precisely how rural places are remade under globalization, and start to account for the differential geographies of globalization across rural space.” (Woods, 2007b, p 490).

Such place-based studies that do exist are, as the above quote implies, fragmentary. There are a handful of studies from the developing world, including ethnographic studies, which recognize, as Bebbington (2001) does for study communities in the Andes, that “the global entanglements in which [rural] localities are enmeshed are, and have long been multi-stranded: beyond market relationships, the webs linking Andean places and the wider world pass through globalized religious institutions, civil society networks, intergovernmental relationships, migrant streams and more” (p. 415). In the United States, Miller (2007) describes the impact of economic globalization on the small town of Niagara, Wisconsin, as experienced through the closure of the dominant employer; whilst Edmondson (2003) examined the ‘rural literacies’ with which residents of a small prairie community seek to re-define their position in the context of globalization. Epp and Whitson’s (2001) collection on western Canada presented a multi-faceted overview of globalization and its impacts in the region, but as an edited volume lacks an integrative analysis. Each of these studies hence has limitations, but more striking still is the virtual absence of any equivalent studies from Europe.

In an attempt to develop a framework for a locality-based analysis of globalization in rural areas, the concept of the ‘global countryside’ has been proposed in Woods (2007b). The ‘global countryside’ is conceived as a hypothetical space characterized by attributes which represent the projected end-point of current globalization processes impacted on rural space (see Box 3.1). As such, the ‘global countryside’ is intended to highlight the multiple ways in which rural places are restructured through globalization, as well as to expose some of the power relations that are involved in such restructuring. Moreover, as the ‘global countryside’ does not exist anywhere in its pure and complete form,
but is rather always in a state of becoming, the concept emphasizes questions about how globalization works in place:

“As this emergent global countryside is not a uniform, homogeneous space, but rather is differentially articulated, and contested, through particular rural places, so the question posed earlier – how are rural places remade under globalization? – becomes central to our understanding of the global countryside.” (Woods, 2007b, p 494).

Thus, understanding globalization in a rural context, and therefore being able to speculate on how rural development strategies can respond to globalization, first requires closer examination of the entangled relationship between ‘global’ and ‘local’ and the spatial dynamics that configure regions in the era of globalization. These issues are discussed further in the next section.

**Box 3.1: Characteristics of the ‘global countryside’ (Woods, 2007b)**

1. Primary and secondary sector economic activity in the global countryside feeds, and is dependent on, elongated yet contingent commodity networks, with consumption distanced from production.

2. The global countryside is the site of increasing corporate concentration and integration, with corporate networks organized on a transnational scale.

3. The global countryside is both the supplier and the employer of migrant labour.

4. The globalization of mobility is also marked by the flow of tourists and amenity migrants through the global countryside, attracted to sites of global rural amenity.

5. The global countryside attracts high levels of non-national property investment, for both commercial and residential purposes.

6. It is not only social and economic relations that are transformed in the global countryside, but also the discursive construction of nature and its management.

7. The landscape of the global countryside is inscribe with the marks of globalization, through deforestation and afforestation; mines and oilfields; tourism infrastructure; the transplantation of plant and animal species; and the proliferation of symbols of global consumer culture, and so on.

8. The global countryside is characterized by increasing social polarization.

9. The global countryside is associated with new sites of political authority.

10. The global countryside is always a contested space.
4. Globalization and Regions

4.1. Global and Local

As the previous section has demonstrated, globalization is not the eradication of the local, nor even necessarily the subordination of the local to the global. Rather, globalization involves the reconfiguration of the local and the global in new relationships in which both retain meaning. As Urry (2003) suggests, “both the global and the local are bound together though a dynamic, irreversible relationship, as huge flows of resources are drawn into and move backwards and forwards between the two. Neither the global nor the local can exist without the other” (p. 15). The symbiotic inter-relationship of the global and the local has been captured in the term ‘glocalization’, which has been deployed in two distinct ways in studies of globalization.

Firstly, ‘glocalization’ has been used to refer to the ‘cultural mixing’ or blending of local and global to produce new cultural hybrids (Robertson, 1995). In this perspective economic and cultural globalization have not produced a single, uniform global culture, but rather have facilitated the ‘selective borrowing’ of translocal cultural influences and their incorporation and amalgamation with local practices to produce new hybrid cultures that are enacted in place. Nederveen Pieterse cites as examples of hybridisation Greenfield’s observations from Japan that, ‘Grandmothers in kimonos bow in gratitude to their automated banking machines. Young couples bring hand-held computer games along for romantic evenings out’ (Greenfield, 1994, p. 230), but he explicitly notes that hybridisation is not a solely urban phenomenon:

“If we look into the countryside virtually anywhere in the world, we find traces of cultural mixing: the crops planted, planting methods and agricultural techniques, implements and inputs used (seeds, fertilizer, irrigation methods, credit) are usually of translocal origin. Farmers and peasants throughout the world are wired, direct or indirect, to the fluctuations of global commodity prices that affect their economies and
Furthermore, the glocalization thesis argues that the hybrids produced through cultural mixing at a local scale in turn become commodified, circulated and consumed at the global scale. The global is hence reconstituted through the local, just as the local is reconstituted through the global. Urry (2003) labels this tendency as the ‘attractor of glocalization’, identifying a two-way gravitational force in which local elements are drawn into global networks and global assemblages are pulled towards grounded localities. As an example he cites mega-events such as the Olympics which he suggests both presuppose the existence of local host cities and reinforce their emergence: “These are places chosen for their supposedly unique, local characteristics that make them especially appropriate for the hosting of what are increasingly global events … These events, premised upon global media and mass tourism, mean that local identity and nation are conceived of through their location within, and upon, that global screening” (Urry, 2003, pp 86-7).

Secondly, glocalization has been employed with a more economic focus to emphasize that all apparently ‘global’ processes and networks and events are in fact in grounded and ‘localized’ in particular places (Swyngedouw, 1997), or, to borrow Dicken’s (2000) phrase, they require ‘spatial fixidness’ to operate. Thus, for example, the global financial system is anchored in very particular localities such as the City of London, which occupy this position because of a range of localized historical, political and cultural factors. Similarly, the global trade in natural resources is locally grounded both by the spatially-fixed location of these resources, such as oil, gas and minerals, and by historical, political and economic factors that shape the conditions of their exploitation and the flow of capital resulting from their trade (Murray, 2006). As such, glocalization deployed in this way stresses the two-way relationship of the local and the global, and asserts that the ‘local’ exists in the ‘global’ and the ‘global’ in the ‘local’ (Dicken, 2000).

Moreover, this take on glocalization highlights the uneven geography of globalization, with the positions of regions within this uneven geography being conditioned not only by physical and historical structural factors, but also by
institutional structures and practices (Murray, 2006). The clustering of certain functions together in particular regions can produce ‘traded interdependencies’ through geographical proximity which help to strengthen the competitiveness and leverage of the region in the global economy. Amin and Thrift (1994) contend that these interdependencies can arise from face-to-face contact, networks of trust established through social and cultural interaction, and the enhancement of knowledge and innovation – conditions that follow from spatial proximity and local embeddedness, but also, critically, conditions that potentially can be created through regional development strategies.

This argument has been developed further in the notion of the ‘new regionalism’, which identifies an opportunity for the reassertion of the regional scale in the context of globalization. New regionalism contends that globalization has weakened the significance of the nation-state, with power and influence dispersed both upwards to supra-national actors, and downwards to regions. As such, it is argued that it is the region, not the nation, that constitutes the most effective scale at which interventions can be made to enhance competitiveness in the global economy. This entails the construction of institutional structures and cultures at the regional scale that support the emergence of traded interdependencies; sometimes involving devolution from the nation-state, but also requiring co-operation and collaboration between localities within the region (Frisken and Norris, 2001; Jonas and Ward, 2007).

The most successful regions in the global era are hence argued to be those which exhibit strong regional institutions and cultures of learning and innovation, supporting clustering and agglomeration with respect to key industries. The classic, commonly cited examples include Baden-Württemberg, Catalonia and Emilia-Romagna, with the assumption being that it is the metropolitan centres in these regions that form the nodal gateways to the global economy, with rural districts networked within city-regions. There are, however, some predominantly rural regions that may also be regarded as models of new regionalism, such as the Scottish Highlands and the West of Ireland. More significantly, perhaps, there is evidence of a ‘ad hoc rural regionalism’ (Hamin and Marcucci, 2008) occurring at a lower scale within rural areas, with the formation of new territorial identities aimed at capturing external trade and investment and consolidating regional
capacities. In Europe, rural development programmes such as LEADER have brought into being new territorial units that may not correspond with the existing administrative geography (Ward and McNicholas, 1998), whilst the delimitation of new territories for designations such as UNESCO Biospheres can subsequently provide new regional structures for social and economic development. Similarly, new territorial identities can emerge as regions as re-packaged to attract tourism, with the proliferation of districts named after literary figures and characters, television programmes and films, and historical events (Storey, 2004, 2009).

Glocalization and the new regionalism can provide useful frameworks for analysing the response of regional economic development strategies to globalization, however, these literatures are also open to critique for continuing to hold the local and global apart as separate planes that interact with each other. Gibson-Graham (2002) argue that there are a number of different ways of conceptualizing the relationship between local and global, identifying six approaches that have been employed in geographic analysis (summarised in Murray, 2006):

1. The global and the local do not exist – they are just ways of framing things.
2. The global and the local each get their meanings from what they are not; that is, in opposition to the other.
3. The global and the local offer different points of view concerning social networks.
4. The global is the local – all global things have local expression.
5. The local is the global – the local is where global processes interact with the surface of the Earth.
6. All spaces are glocal – the global is constituted by the local and vice versa.

Glocalization in theory follows the sixth of these propositions, but in practice its empirical application can be criticised for not pushing the logic of this approach far enough. Accounts of globalization, including much work that claims to employ the concept of glocalization, too often fall into the trap identified by Massey (2005), who argues that,
“There is an overwhelming tendency both in academic and political literature, and other forms of discourse, and in political practice to imagine the local as the product of the global but to neglect the counterpoint to this: the local construction of the global. ‘Local places’ in a general sense, whether they be nation-states or cities or small localities, are characteristically understood as produced through globalisation.” (Massey, 2005, p 101)

Instead, Massey proposes that globalization needs to be viewed through a relational understanding of space that accommodates the ‘throwntogetherness’ of place: that place is an ever-shifting constellation of trajectories, enacted through the negotiation of local and global, human and nonhuman actants. This perspective begins to collapse the notions of local and global, as the global is always entangled in local places. It is through these entanglements that the global can effect changes in local places, but it is also through entanglements in place that the global is produced. As such, the local and the global are seen not in opposition to each other, but in negotiation, with different outcomes in each place producing the uneven geography of globalization:

“in a relational understanding of neoliberal globalisation ‘places’ are criss-crossings in the wider power-geometries that constitute both themselves and ‘the global’. On this view local places are not simply always the victims of the global; nor are they always politically defensible redoubts against the global. Understanding space as the constant open production of topologies of power points to the fact that different ‘places’ will stand in contrasting relations to the global.” (Massey, 2005, p 101).

Massey hence calls for a new variegated politics that takes account of the ‘constitutive interrelatedness’ of place. She argues, for example, “that it is no response to globalisation simply to press the case of the local. The political meaning of ‘local’ cannot be determined outside of specific contextual reference. Local/global in itself cannot be an adequate surface along which to constitute political antagonism. The political question becomes not whether globalisation but what kinds of interrelations are to construct an alternative globalisation, and
thus not simply a defence of place-as-is, but the political project of the nature of places within [the global]” (Massey, 2005, p 181).

Massey’s relational understanding of space corresponds with recent work that has pointed to the hybrid constitution of rural space, “defined by networks in which heterogeneous entities are aligned in a variety of ways … these networks give rise to slightly different countrysides: there is no single vantage point from which the panoply of rural or countryside relations can be seen” (Murdoch, 2003, p 274; see also Cloke, 2006; Rudy, 2005; Woods, 2007b). As detailed in Woods (2007b), these different bodies of literature can be drawn together to suggest that the reconstitution of rural places under globalization involves hybridization at three levels: the interaction of multiple strands of globalization; the fusing of local and global formations; and the entanglement of human and non-human actors and elements. Accordingly, it can be argued that,

"The reconstitution of rural spaces under globalization results from the permeability of rural localities as hybrid assemblages of human and non-human entities, knitted-together intersections of networks and flows that are never wholly fixed or contained at the local scale, and whose constant shape-shifting eludes a singular representation of place. Globalization processes introduce into rural localities new networks of global interconnectivity, which become threaded through and entangled with existing local assemblages, sometimes acting in concert and sometimes pulling local actants in conflicting directions. Through these entanglements, intersections and entrapments, the experience of globalization changes rural places, but it never eradicates the local. Rather, the networks, flows and actors introduced by globalization processes fuse and combine with extant local entities to produce new hybrid formations. In this way, places in the emergent global countryside retain their local distinctiveness, but they are also different to how they were before." (Woods, 2007b, pp 499-500).

The negotiations and interactions described above do not take place in a vacuum, but are played out in the context of pre-existing social, economic, environmental and political structures that can help to shape the outcomes. This is where geographical location, accessibility and the physical environment can
have an effect, as can the policies of national and regional governments, as well as the regional institutional structures and cultures highlighted in the new regionalist literature. Globalization will hence have a different manifestation in different rural localities. Local actors also have a direct influence on the outcome of globalization processes in rural regions, not as a bulwark of resistance to globalization, but as co-authors in the transformation of place and the reproduction of globalization:

“This then is the paradox of the global countryside. Rural localities are transformed by new connections that are forged with global networks, global processes and global actors; yet this transformation cannot occur without the enrolment and acquiescence of local actors, both human and non-human, whose very incorporation in turn modifies the networks of which they are part to produce new, hybrid outcomes. Viewed from this perspective, globalization cannot be reduced to the subordination of the local by global forces; nor the power of the global to domination. Rather, the impact of globalization in reshaping rural places is manifest through processes of negotiation, manipulation and hybridization, contingent on the mobilization of associational power, and conducted through but not contained by local micro-politics.” (Woods, 2007b, pp 501-502).

The roles played by local political leaders, entrepreneurs and social movements as the interpreters and mediators of globalization have been well documented in both rural and urban settings (e.g. Crot, 2006; Gray and Sinclair, 2005; Shatkin, 2004; Stahre, 2004; Woods, 2009a). These can range for attempts at outright resistance to proactive boosterism, as well as pragmatic decision-making that seeks to balance pressures from different political quarters (Gray and Sinclair, 2005). Frequently, these negotiations can proceed without explicit mention of globalization: debates around planning policy and development control, access to affordable housing, corporate ownership, conservation controls, tourism development, and so on, can be proxies for contesting the impact of globalization in localities (Crot, 2006; Edmondson, 2003; Woods, 2009a).

Moreover, localities are also transformed by the anticipatory actions of local leaders, who employ explicit or implicit globalization discourses to justify courses
of action intended to prepare and strengthen a locality for global engagement. For example, investment in new transport or communications infrastructure may be justified in terms of the enhanced connectivity to global networks. As Crot (2006) observes in the urban context of Buenos Aires, “globalizing pressures on cities [and rural areas] are mediated by endogenous local institutional structures, social practices, and political decisions whose transformative power may be much more influential than globalization itself” (p. 229).

Yet, these interventions do not add up to evidence for an autonomous local political sphere. As Massey (2005) notes, “each local struggle is already a relational achievement, drawing from both within and beyond ‘the local’” (p. 182). Magnusson and Shaw (2003) demonstrate this for a conflict over industrial logging in western Canada – a clash between the imperatives of economic globalization and the globalization of values – which immediately transcends the locality with networks of participants involving national and international actors on both sides, and elements of the debate transported into distant newspaper columns, street stalls, boycott campaigns, corporate meetings and parliamentary debating chambers. Even local social movements that appear to be most militantly anti-global are commonly at least in part globally constituted. Williams (2008), for example, shows how the celebrated attack by José Bové and the Confédération Paysanne on the McDonald’s restaurant in Millau, France, was the product of the gradual construction over a number of years of a hybrid culture in the Larzac region through the settlement of activists initially attracted by protests over a military camp, who subsequently mixed with the local population and participated in the local industry of cheese production for export, whilst retaining interests in global peace and environmental campaigns. Furthermore, as Bové turned his defence into a case against neoliberal globalization, he did so by harnessing the power of the global media and global transport networks to link his protest to campaigns around the world (Woods, 2007b).

Whilst these complex (trans-)local politics of the global countryside might be most apparent in cases of overt political confrontation, the same principles arguably apply in more routine areas of governance such as regional development.
4.2. Region, Scale and Place

Rethinking the conceptualization of global and local, as discussed in the previous section, has implications for the meaning and use of key geographical referents such as scale, territory, place, network and region, and for the vocabulary that can be employed in discussing questions about ‘regional’ responses to globalization.

In particular, the concept of ‘scale’ has been the subject of intensive debate in recent years. Scale is intrinsically connected to any analysis of globalization as the relationship between the global and the local is popularly perceived as primarily a different in scale. This perception reflects dominance of the mindset of a vertical hierarchy, with the global at the top and the local at the bottom, which was essentially taken-for-granted in geography and related studies. However, the complex realities of globalization discussed above, in which the global and the local do not exist as two parallel planes, but rather are entangled together in particular places, have also challenged the validity and usefulness of the vertical model of scale. As such, scale has been revealed as socially or politically constructed (Delaney and Leitner, 1997), with multiple transgressions and incursions.

Interest in scale was manifest in the 1980s through the binary emergence of investigations into globalization and of renewed localities studies (Cooke, 1989), as well as through attempts to understand how politics moved between scales (Smith, 1992). In the 1990s these interests developed into what Jessop et al. (2008) describe as the ‘scalar turn’, with concerns with scale becoming central in much work in political and economic geography and sociology, serving to “generate a new lexicon of geographical scale with which scholars could investigate diverse rescaling processes and scale-jumping practices in historical and contemporary perspective” (Jessop et al., 2008, p. 390). These studies commonly tended to use scale as a framework for representing and analysing the re-orderings involved in state restructuring and allied political-economic transformations, but they also required researchers to reflect on and refine the meaning of scale. As Marston et al. (2005) observe, “different researchers have nuanced scale is different ways” (p. 417), leading to a proliferation of definitions.
such that Marston et al. argue that “there is no agreement on what is meant by the term or how it should be operationalized” (p. 416).

Several of the contributions to the scale literature have grappled with questions that are of direct relevance to DERREG, including the positioning of ‘local politics’ in the global age. Of particular note is the intervention by Cox (1998), in which he introduces the concepts of ‘spaces of dependence’ and ‘spaces of engagement’. A space of dependence is “a space within which it is possible to substitute one socio(-spatial) relation for another but beyond which such substitution is difficult if not impossible” (Cox, 1998, p 5). For property developers, the space of dependence is circumscribed by the territorial extent of their knowledge of the property market and their relationships with lenders and subcontractors – beyond these limits their capacity to act is limited. Similarly, the space of dependence of a local government body is defined by its territorial authority. Cox recognizes that spaces of dependence exist at different scales, such that they cannot be equated with the local scale, although they are always grounded in place. As spaces of dependence are necessary for functioning of locally-grounded social and economic actors, Cox suggests that local politics concerns the struggle to protect such spaces in the face of ‘more global’ relationships that threaten to dissolve or undermine them:

“People, firms state agencies, etc., organize in order to secure the conditions for the continued existence of their spaces of dependence but in doing so they have to engage with other centers of social power: local government, the national press, perhaps the international press, for example. In so doing they construct a different form of space which I call here a space of engagement: the space in which the politics of securing a space of dependence unfolds.” (Cox, 1998, p. 2)

Spaces of engagement may extend to different scales than that occupied by the space of dependence, but this may involve ‘jumping down’ scales just as much as ‘jumping up’. Transnational corporations need to forge connections with local governments and chambers of commerce as much as local activists might seek to secure support from global media or international NGOs. In this way, Cox’s model can be helpful for examining the linkages between local and non-local
actors that are part of the process of globalization in rural regions (although M Smith (1998) criticises Cox for not engaging directly with globalization and not differentiating between different non-local scales).

Through the concepts of ‘spaces of dependence’ and ‘spaces of engagement’, Cox demonstrates the fluidity and permeability of scale, but still holds on to scale as a useful framing device. Where he departs from the vertical model of nested hierarchies, however, is in rejecting the description of scales in territorial terms, arguing instead that “a more appropriate metaphor for the spatiality of scale ... is that of the network” (Cox, 1998, p. 2).

The adoption of a network approach to rethinking the spatialities of scale and social processes is shared by Leitner (2004), who suggests that vertical nested hierarchies of territorial scales have been joined in the globalized era by new horizontal networks of spatial relations. These horizontal networks do not negate vertical scale, but challenge it by providing the basis for an alternative power-geometry that connects localities to the global in a different way, through reach rather than vertical integration:

"transnational networks represent new modes of coordination and governance, a new politics of horizontal relations that also has a distinct spatiality. Whereas the spatiality of a politics of scale is associated with vertical relations among nested territorially defined political entities, by contrast, networks span space rather than covering it, transgressing the boundaries that separate and define these political entities” (Leitner, 2004, p. 237)

A third attempt to move beyond the rigidity of the nested hierarchy model is presented by Richard Smith (2003), who argues that world cities have become so entangled that to separate them, or to define their scalar limits, is meaningless. As such, Smith rejects ideas of scales and boundaries and proposes instead a conception of globalization as characterized by fluidity and flow:

"In contrast to ... interest in scales, boundaries and territories, my ontology of globalization fluidifies such solidified thinking revolving around such
motifs as fluidity and flow, movement and mobility, folds and networks. A consequence of that ontology – where all that is solid melts into air – is a rejection of scales and boundaries altogether as globalization and world cities are too intermingled through scattered lines of humans and non-humans to be delimited in any meaningful sense” (Smith, 2003, p. 570).

However, Marston et al. (2005) contend that Smith’s thesis fails to entirely escape scale because it continues to reference globalization. They note that there is a “tendency for global, typological categories – here the ‘world city’ and ‘globalization’ – to slip in through the back door: concepts placed under erasure that nevertheless found and ground the flows that supposedly make them meaningless” (p. 423). Indeed, Marston et al. reject all attempts to redefine and nuance scale, including Cox and Leitner, because they see scale itself as fundamentally flawed in the intrinsic privileging the causality of perceived ‘higher’ scales, a tendency that they identify as persisting throughout the evolution of work on globalization:

“'The concept [of the 'global economy'] became instantiated in the 1980s lexicon with the arrival of a 'localities research' agenda focusing on the local 'effects' of 'broader-scale economic restructuring' ... In spite of numerous attempts to redress the language of 'touching down' (by, for example, seeing the local in the global), it is difficult to argue with the claim that, over the past 20 years, political and economic geographers have tended toward macro pronouncements that assigned the global more causal force, assumed it to be more orderly (if not law-like) and less contingent, and, by implication, relegated its other [the local] to the status of the case study. This is why, we believe, localities researchers more often looked 'up' to 'broader restructurings' than 'sideways' to those proximate or even distant localities from which those events arguably emerged.” (Marston et al., 2005, p. 421).

Instead, Marston et al. propose a ‘flat ontology’ which starts with ‘sites’ and proceeds to follow connections without engaging scale at all. They argue that this approach creates more entry points for progressive politics, by escaping from the presuppositions that hide power-relations behind meta-concepts such as the
global and globalization. As an example they suggest that “the imaginary transposition from boardroom to global corporation obscures those sites of ordering practices, as well as the possibilities for undoing them” (Marston et al., 2005, p. 427).

Marston et al.’s argument has been criticised in a number of papers (e.g. Collinge, 2006; Escobar, 2007; Hoefle, 2006; Jonas, 2006; Leitner and Miller, 2007), both through a critique of their proposal for a flat ontology, and through a defence of scale as a concept. In particular, critics have argued that scale continues to have greater purchase than a flat ontology in exposing the complex politics surrounding place. Hoefle (2006), for instance, conveys this through an example of the entangled environmental, ethnic and developmental politics of the Amazon: “even if social movements try to circumvent top-down political hierarchies, one has to understand the latter to be able to understand what they are reacting to, and most importantly the success or failure of alternative politics in the Amazon hinges on working through all the scales of political alliances and not just getting off an international flight and barging into communities in a top-down fashion” (p. 238). Transposed to the context of regional development and globalization, Marston et al.’s flat ontology may have value as a way of following connections out from a place without making scalar assumptions, but it has little relevance to practical application in regional development responses, which continue to be delimited by scale.

Jonas (2006) similarly defends the region as a concept, whilst accepting that it need not be conceived entirely in scalar terms: “The point is not that we should abandon the region altogether as a (discrete) scalar or theoretical construct but that we should be explicit about how different scalar and non-scalar understandings come into play in the making of regions as new economic and political spaces. There is something causally and politically important about the ‘region’ but one does not necessarily need a concept of the ‘region-as-scale-in-hierarchy’ to discover why this might be the case” (p. 403).

This line of thinking is developed by Jessop et al. (2008), who propose the ‘TPSN’ framework embracing the key sociospatial dimensions of territory, place, scale and network. For Jessop et al., the problem is not scale per se, but that scale,
along with territory, place and network, have each been successively emphasized in conceptualizations of socio-spatial relations to the exclusion of the other dimensions. This, they suggest, has produced a number of fallacies that give only a partial perspective on socio-spatial relations (see table 4.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension of sociospatial relations</th>
<th>Principle of sociospatial structuration</th>
<th>Associated patterning of sociospatial relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>Bordering, bounding, parcelization, enclosure</td>
<td>Construction of inside/outside divides; constitutive role of the ‘outside’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place</td>
<td>Proximity, spatial embedding, areal differentiation</td>
<td>Construction of spatial divisions of labour; differentiation of social relations horizontally among ‘core’ versus ‘peripheral’ places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale</td>
<td>Hierarchization, vertical differentiation</td>
<td>Construction of scalar divisions of labour; differentiation of social relations vertically among ‘dominant’, ‘nodal’ and ‘marginal’ scales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networks / reticulation</td>
<td>Interconnectivity, interdependence, transversal or ‘rhizomatic’ differentiation</td>
<td>Building networks of nodal connectivity; differentiation of social relations among nodal points within topological networks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1: Four key dimensions of socio-spatial relations, from Jessop et al. (2008)

Jessop et al. propose moving beyond this one-dimensionalism to “a more systematic investigation of how sociospatial relations, understood as strategically selective TPSN ensembles, interact in specific historical-geographical contexts to produce distinctive orderings and re-orderings of the sociospatial landscape” (p. 395). In practice, this means exploring the interconnections and overlaps between the concepts of territory, place, scale and networks to produce a multi-dimensional perspective on socio-spatial relations (table 4.2).

Jessop et al. emphasize that the framework is developmental and that the orientations suggested in table 4.2 are tentative and indicative. However, the framework potentially forms a useful mechanism for thinking about the ways in which rural regions are engaged in and restructured through globalization. In DERREG, we have implicitly identified territory as the primary field of operation for our enquiries, having selected case study regions that are territorially defined. However, following the TSPN framework, we need to conscious not only of how our case study regions are constituted and operate as regions (e.g.
through the structures of administrative governance and the territorial fixing of regional development plans), but also how these regions are also structured and positioned in terms of place, scale and networks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structuring principles</th>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Networks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>Past, present and emergent frontiers, borders, boundaries</td>
<td>Distinct places in a given territory</td>
<td>Multilevel government</td>
<td>Interstate system, state alliances, multi-area government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place</td>
<td>Core-periphery borderlands, empires, neomediaevalism</td>
<td>Locales, milieux, cities, sites, regions, localities, globalities</td>
<td>Division of labor linked to differently scales places</td>
<td>Local/urban governance, partnerships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale</td>
<td>Scalar division of political power (unitary state, federal state, etc.)</td>
<td>Scale as area rather than level (local through to global), spatial division of labor (Russian doll)</td>
<td>Vertical ontology based on nested or tangled hierarchies</td>
<td>Parallel power networks, nongovernmental international regimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networks</td>
<td>Origin-edge ripple effects (radiation), stretching and folding, crossborder region, interstate system</td>
<td>Global city networks, polynucleated cities, intermeshed sites</td>
<td>Flat ontology with multiple ascalar entry points</td>
<td>Networks of networks, spaces of flows, rhizome</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2: Conceptual orientations in the TSPN framework, from Jessop et al. (2008).

Thus, a region also exists as a place, with an imagined cultural identity and history, which may not necessarily be spatially congruent with the fixed boundaries of the territory. Indeed, following Massey’s (1994, 2005) conceptualisation of place as a meeting-point, it needs to be acknowledged that place may be territorially defined but cannot be territorially constrained, and that the distinctiveness of a place is dependent on particular configurations of connections and networks and flows that may transcend both territory and scale. Furthermore, regions as territories are comprised by many different places that co-exist competitively within the region, as a different scalar fixing of place. Regions themselves can also be thought of as particular scalar fixes within a nested administrative hierarchy that structures the vertical flow of policies, authority and governmental actions (see box 4.1). Finally, the case study regions
are also structured as areas of entanglement of networks, which may operated internally within the defined territory, or which can extend outwards connecting the region horizontally with diverse other regions.

On some occasions in the research it may be appropriate to shift our starting point, and to focus on place, scale or networks as the field of operation under investigation, and to consider how these are structured through the other dimensions of the TSPN framework. For example, we may prioritise the dimension of networks, for instance in examining business networks or the ties of migrant workers, and investigate how a network is articulated across territories, and shaped by national and regional borders, or how it is anchored in particular places, or how it reaches up or down across vertical scales, maybe in engaging governmental institutions that are constituted at different administrative scales.

**Box 4.1: Vocabularies of Scale**

As is evident from the discussion in this section, scale is a slippery and contested concept and it should at least be acknowledged that hierarchies of scale are always socially and politically constructed. This has implications for the vocabulary that can be used to refer to institutions, policies and networks that appear to operate at different vertical scales. ‘Global’ and ‘local’ are particularly difficult scales to define and fix with any intrinsic meaning, and as such their usefulness in research such as DERREG can be questioned.

Instead, the following terms are proposed to refer to different scales of operation that are relevant in DERREG. Following the implications of the TSPN framework, two sets of terms are proposed along two different axes: the first referring to the *reach* networks and flows, and the second referring to the territorial *coverage and competence* of institutions and policies.

To describe the **reach of networks and flows**, the following terms are proposed:

- **Multinational** – A network or web that stretches across the territories of three or more nation states, for example the supply network of a business that sources supplies from a number of different countries.
- **International** – A network or flow that connects regions in two non-neighbouring countries, for example, the flow of migrant workers from Lithuania to Ireland and back.
**Cross-border** – A network of flow that crosses an international border to connect adjacent regions in different countries, for example trade between Goriška in Slovenia and the neighbouring Gorizia district in Italy.

**Inter-regional** – Networks and flows that operate within the territory of a nation state, but connect a case study region with other regions in the same country.

**Intra-regional** – Networks and flows operating entirely within the case study region.

To describe the **coverage and competence of institutions, policies and initiatives**, the following terms are proposed:

**Supra-national** – Institutions and policies constituted at a scale above the nation state and with a competence extending across several nation states, for example the European Union and its policies.

**Trans-national** – Institutions, policies and initiatives that have regional focus or limited territorial expression, but which transcend national borders between two or more countries. For example, INTERREG projects, or agencies working with migrant workers in both source and destination countries.

**National** – Institutions, policies and initiatives operating at the level of the nation-state and with a competence extending across the whole of the territory of the national state (or all relevant parts, e.g. a rural development plan is ‘national’ if it relates to all rural areas of the country, even though it by definition excludes urban parts of the country).

**Sub-national** – Institutions, policies and initiatives that are focused on only part of the territory of a nation state, but which have a coverage that extends beyond the boundaries of the defined case study region. For some smaller case study region this may include provincial or regional government, e.g. the provincial authorities of Galicia in relation to the case study region of Comarca de Verin.

**Regional** – Institutions, policies and initiatives that are pitched at the same level as the case study region. The territorial fit may not necessarily be exact, but the spatial coverage should be largely congruent.

**Sub-regional** – Institutions, policies and initiatives operating within the case study region but with a territorial remit that extends over only part of the region. For larger case study regions this may include local authority units, for example, the individual Kreise within Saarland.

**Municipal** – Institutions, policies and initiatives relating to individual municipalities (or the equivalent community level of territorial governance) within the case study region.
5. RURAL-REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

5.1. Trends in Rural and Regional Development

5.1.1 Defining Rural and Regional Development

The objective of DERREG is to “produce an interpretative model that will enable regional development actors to better anticipate and respond to the challenges for rural regions arising from globalization”. As such, we need to connect analysis of the remaking of rural regions under globalization with practical actions that can be applied to the development of rural regions. This means understanding how rural and regional development works and how it contributes to the reconstitution of rural places under globalization, and identifying opportunities where interventions can be made through rural and regional development strategies that will help rural regions respond to the challenges posed by globalization.

The development of rural regions involves two parallel and inter-connected, but in policy terms separate, processes. First, rural development, defined by the OECD as “a broad notion encompassing all important decisions pertinent to the collective vitality of rural people and places ... [including] education, health, housing, public services and facilities, capacity for leadership and governance, and cultural heritage as well as sectoral and general economic issues” (OECD 1990, p 23, quoted by Moseley, 2003, p. 4). Second, regional development is concerned with the development of a specified territorial region, and tends to have a more predominantly economic focus. Rural development and regional development hence have different rationales, different spatial imaginaries, and tend to be the responsibility of different parts of government.

Rural development, for instance, has the rationale of improving the quality of life in rural areas and sustaining the viability of rural communities, and as such much of its focus over the last quarter-century and more has been on diversifying rural economies away from primary industry. Whilst rural development strategies are often framed and delivered locally (Moseley, 2003), in macro terms rural development sets principles and priorities at the level of the whole countryside,
and assumes that there are commonalities between different rural areas. Regional development, in contrast, has the rationale of reducing social and economic inequalities between regions and promoting convergence and coherence in the interests of economic and political stability. Regional development also has a different spatial imaginary, conceiving rural and urban areas to be connected in the same regional system, and comparing regions competitively. In the European Union, rural development has been an adjunct of the Common Agricultural Policy, initially as support for agricultural modernization and later as support for diversification away from agriculture, and delivered through initiatives such as LEADER. Regional development has been part of EU regional policy and convergence policy, administered by a different directorate within the Commission and delivered through the European Regional Development Funds (c.f. box 2.2).

In practice, however, there is considerable overlap between the objectives and instruments of rural development and regional development, and the two processes are commonly fused together in social and economic development as experienced in rural regions – or, what we might call here, rural-regional development. In spite of their different rationales, the principles and approaches employed in rural development and regional development are similar, and have progressed in a similar way over last three decades. These changes can therefore be distilled into three key trends that can be identified in the framing and delivery of rural-regional development, as outlined in turn below.

5.1.2 From Top-Down to Bottom-Up Development
Rural-regional development, as practised through much of the post-Second World War period, was framed by the discourse that the state needed to intervene to develop rural areas. This could be done through infrastructure projects, incentives for investors, the direct construction and operation of industrial plants, or market interventions, but it all essentially was premised on rural-regional development as something that was done to and for rural regions, not as something done by and with rural communities. Rural-regional development was directed and delivered from the top-down, with decision-making and strategic planning handled centrally and only responsibility for
delivery delegated to regional development agencies and local and regional government.

However, the model of top-down development was severely criticised during the 1980s on a number of counts. Firstly, it was attacked as undemocratic, and therefore as ineffective, because it excluded from decision-making local people who, critics argued, were better placed than distant politicians and bureaucrats to decide on rural-regional development priorities and mechanisms (Edwards, 1998). Secondly, it was accused of lacking accountability, with concerns about corruption, vanity projects and the diversion of funds in some parts of Europe. In short, as A Smith (1998) puts it, rural-regional development programmes were “actually financing ‘the wrong actors’” (p. 227). Thirdly, the state-centred top-down approach was increasingly out of step with the growth of neoliberalism and its agenda of ‘rolling back the state’ (Cheshire, 2006).

The result was a switch to the ‘bottom-up’ approach in rural-regional development, with the lead being taken by rural communities, supported by the state in its function as a facilitator. In governmentality terms, this has been described as a transition from the state-centred social democratic model of advanced liberalism, to a neoliberal strategy of ‘governing through communities’ (Cheshire, 2006; Murdoch, 1997).

The implementation of the ‘bottom-up’ approach has been founded on four key mechanism. First, a range of participatory methods have been employed to engage rural people in the rural-regional development planning process, including community plans, planning for real exercises, surveys, consultation exercises, and so on (Edwards, 1998; Korf, 2007; Moseley, 2003). Second, partnership working has been established as the preferred vehicle for managing rural-regional development, involving government agencies, the private sector and community organizations and representatives (Edwards et al., 2000; Moseley, 2003; A Smith, 1998; Westholm et al., 1999). Third, emphasis has been placed on ‘capacity-building’, to encourage entrepreneurialism and to support the development of community-led projects. Fourth, financial support and resources for rural-regional development have been provided by the state through competitive funding programmes, in which community groups and local
partnerships are invited to bid for limited resources (Edwards et al., 2000; Jones and Little, 2000).

The bottom-up approach has been celebrated by its supporters for empowering rural communities and fostering innovation and entrepreneurialism whilst retaining cultural diversity (Moseley, 2003). It is now widely accepted that “initiatives aiming at encouraging and supporting regional economic development always should be initiated from within the region” (Johannisson and Dahlstrand, 2009). Yet, critics have questioned the extent to which the bottom-up approach has truly dispersed decision-making power in rural regions, and the capacity of rural communities to benefit equally. The assumption of democratic participation and accountability has been critiqued by studies that have highlighted limited public participation in the process, the clustering of involvement by local elites, and the unequal power relations within partnerships (Edwards et al., 2000, 2001; Derkzen et al., 2008; Derkzen and Bock, 2009). The position of state agencies as the funding-bodies and the representation of key professionals from state agencies across different partnerships means that the state continues to play a major role in steering rural-regional development (Edwards et al., 2000, 2001; Derkzen and Bock, 2007), whilst influence has also been vested in a growing cohort of rural-regional development professionals (Kovács and Kucerova, 2006). Moreover, not all rural communities are equally placed to compete for rural-regional development funds and to implement projects, with communities with strong professional middle class populations advantaged (Woods et al., 2007), but the devolution of responsibility for rural-regional development to rural communities could also be interpreted as devolving blame for failure (Cheshire, 2006).

5.1.3 From Inward Investment to Endogenous Development

The transition in the mechanisms of rural-regional development, from top-down to bottom-up development, has been accompanied by a transition in the form and focus of rural-regional development, from a reliance on inward investment to an emphasis on endogenous development. Although top-down development strategies could support endogenous development, they often looked for external solutions to rural-regional development problems, either through state-led infrastructure projects or through the attraction of inward investment. Inward
investment, especially in manufacturing, was regarded in many rural regions as the vehicle for replacing lost employment in agriculture and providing a stable economic base for a stable population (McDonagh, 2001; Woods, 2009b).

Whilst inward investment has been important in driving economic growth in many rural regions, it has also directly contributed to economic globalization and the integration of rural localities into multinational networks. Benefits have come through access to new trade opportunities and markets and the supply of international capital for investment, but dependency on global firms has also made regional rural economies more vulnerable to distant economic events and to the spatial selectivity of multinational corporations. Inglis's (2008) case study of the inward investment and subsequent withdrawal after 30 years of the Japanese electronics manufacturer, NEC in the small Irish town of Ballivor – discussed in section 3.2.1 – exemplifies this vulnerability. Critics have also argued that inward investment can often deliver only limited benefits to the local economy, as profits are removed from the region and jobs often created for in-migrants rather than for endogenous local people. Evensole and Martin (2007), writing in the context of rural Australia, warn that “it is easy to assume, in a linear fashion, that more industry and more money in a region translate to a better lifestyle for rural communities. Yet ... other issues come into play: jobs may not be forthcoming, local resources may become scarcer as a result of the new industry’s presence, and local expectations may not be met. New industry development is seldom if ever an unqualified success story for everyone concerned” (pp 119-120).

Partly in response to these criticisms, the shift to a bottom-up approach in rural-regional development in Europe has been accompanied by a new emphasis on endogenous development (it also in part reflects the limited capacity of disaggregated bottom-up initiatives to attract inward investment, especially from global corporations). Endogenous development refers to economic development that is based on the use, development and commodification of resources that are found within a rural regions, including natural resources, traditional products, symbolic resources such as landscape and heritage, and human capital. Economic development based on these resources is presumed to be more
sustainable and more stable than inward investment, and is argued to deliver more benefits directly to the regional economy.

Ray (2000) described the LEADER programme as a ‘laboratory’ for endogenous rural development, in that it has required each LEADER group to “search for innovative ideas that not only would assist socio-economic viability in the locality but also serve a demonstrative function for other participating territories” (p. 166). As such, Ray argued that rural-regional development as promoted through LEADER aimed to “maximize the retention of benefits within the local territory by valorizing and exploiting local resources – physical and human” (p. 166). Projects supported by LEADER have therefore tended to be small-scale and locally-embedded. Nonetheless, the various incarnations of LEADER have played a key role in establishing the primacy of endogenous development in rural-regional development strategies in Europe.

Endogenous development is however restricted by the resources available in the region. As such, endogenous development in rural regions has tended to focus on the valorization of the regional ‘culture economy’, including its landscape, agricultural traditions and food, and heritage (Cawley and Gillmor, 2007; Ilbery and Kneafsey, 1998; Kneafsey et al., 2001; Vergunst et al., 2009). Significantly, perhaps, Ray (1999), in developing the idea of ‘culture economy’, explicitly positions the exploitation of regional cultural resources as a response to globalization, which can not only help to sustain regional economies in the face of economic globalization, but which can also help to assert regional cultural identity in the face of cultural globalization: “local cultural identity, far from being a fixed or reactionary concept can form the basis of a dynamic, ‘progressive’ and flexible approach to endogenous development in the era of globalization” (Ray, 1999, p 526).

5.1.4 From the Space Economy to Place-based Development
Alongside the above two trends has been a reorientation in the spatial framing of rural-regional development. In the post-Second World War period, the key problem facing rural regions was framed as their peripherality within the space economy. As such, a significant slice of rural-regional development policy in this era was focused on improving the connections between rural regions and the
wider world. This included the construction of new roads, airports and other transport infrastructure, as well as investment in electrification and telecommunications projects. The growing purchase of the globalization discourse, which held that time-space convergence had eradicated the disadvantages of distance experienced by rural regions, together with criticisms of the environmental costs of new roads and airports and concerns that such investments benefited in-migrants rather than endogenous local people, combined to produce a shift to a place-based approach (Woods, 2009b).

As Markey et al. (2008) summarise, the place-based approach is focused on how to make localities attractive for external investment in the presumed globalized economy in which conventional spatial barriers have been reduced: "The question now is: if capital can locate anywhere, why would it locate here? This re-thinking of ‘place’ rather than ‘space’ challenges homogenous interpretations of ‘rural’ in particular, uncovering the latent diversity noted in other rural research" (p. 411).

A further significant feature of the place-based approach is that it adopts an integrated perspective on rural-regional development across different sectors within a specified territory. As such, it represents a point of convergence between rural development and regional development. In its territorial framing it is a natural companion for bottom-up development, and it also forms a bridge between inward investment and endogenous development, holding that the assertion of place identity that is part of endogenous development can also help to attract external investment capital in a competitive global economy. The place-based, or area-based, approach has become dominant in European rural-regional development, again promoted by programmes such as LEADER (Moseley, 2003).

Yet, there are dangers in prioritising place identity over spatial relations in rural-regional development. As demonstrated in earlier sections of this paper, the idea that time-space convergence has eradicated distance to produce a flat economy in which places can compete with each other on equal terms, is a fallacy. A recent analysis of the relative economic performance of rural areas in England, for example, has shown that spatial factors such as peripherality and
accessibility, and infrastructural factors such as economic structure, government infrastructure and road infrastructure, continue to be key determinants of economic development (Agarwal et al., 2009). Distance and accessibility are still significant in influencing the capacity of rural regions to break into the global economy, affecting relative costs of production, or the attractiveness to tourists (Woods, 2009b).

5.2. The Web of Rural-Regional Development

The policy shifts discussed in the previous section have been argued to add up to the emergence of a new rural development paradigm, replacing the modernization paradigm that had dominated in rural Europe since at least the end of the Second World War (Van der Ploeg et al., 2000). Yet, as van der Ploeg et al. (2000) noted, the mechanics of the new paradigm – how it actually worked in practice to regenerate rural areas – remained unclear. Policy discourses that makes claims about bottom-up development, endogenous development and place-based approaches tell us how policy-makers think rural-regional development should work, but they tell us little about how rural-regional development actually happens in practice on the ground. Van der Ploeg et al. (2000) accordingly called for a new empirically-informed theorization of rural development, arguing that, “the hard core of what constitutes the essence of rural development will emerge as the strength, scope and impact of current rural development practices become clear. Much will depend on the capacity of scholars to develop an empirically grounded theory.” (Van der Ploeg et al., 2000, p. 391).

The pursuit of this goal subsequently formed the basis of the ETUDE project, funded under Framework Programme 6, the results of which are reported in van der Ploeg and Marsden (2008). Most importantly, ETUDE has posited the notion of the ‘rural web’ as a way of capturing the complex relations that constitute rural regions and the dynamics of rural-regional development and governance. Ventura et al. (2008) describe the web as “the hybrid network through which the complexity of rural spaces is made coherent in order to underpin their sustainable governance” (p. 151), with van der Ploeg et al. (2008) adding that “a rural web is composed by the interrelations, interactions, encounters and
mutualities that exist between actors, resources, activities (be they social, economic, political or cultural), sectors and places within rural areas (p. 7). The web is hence dynamic, and it is through the evolution of webs that rural development takes place. As Ventura et al. (2008) remark, “this implies building inter-relationships that can lead to the creation of site-specific and promising solutions for maintaining and developing rural identities and economies. These inter-relationships also result in the creation of conditions that strengthen the quality of life and the attractiveness and liveability of rural areas” (pp 151-152).

The rural web is conceived both as an analytical tool and as an approach to rural development strategies (Ventura et al., 2008, p 170). As an analytical tool, the web is presented as providing a framework for examining inter-actions between six domains or dimensions, which have been identified in the ETUDE research as contributing to the functioning of rural-regional development (figure 5.1). As the empirical research from ETUDE suggests, rural-regional development involves inter-actions between these domains, but the nature of these configurations and the emphasis that is placed on different domains, will vary between regions, influenced by factors including policy arrangements (Kanemasu, 2008; Kanemasu et al., 2008).

The first dimension in the web is endogeneity, defined as “the degree to which a regional economy is grounded on regionally specific resources and, simultaneously, it develops them” (van der Ploeg, 2008, p. 8). According to Ventura et al. (2008), the web is both a source and an outcome of endogenous development, which produces and reproduces ‘territorial capital’ as an externality of economic activity. They argue that the web is strengthened when rural-regional development involves the hybridization of different endogenous fields of activity, for example, when “food production embodies landscape or cultural distinctiveness in the product, or when farm based agri-tourism becomes part of a collective supply that is coherent with the identity of the area” (p. 170). Endogeneity was identified as the prevailing domain in 13 of the 63 case studies examined by ETUDE, that is the key driver of development, often in strong interaction with the ‘novelty’ and ‘social capital’ domains:
Responding to the ‘squeeze’ on rural economies by raising its competitiveness

1. Endogeneity: Building on local resources and enlarging the interaction with wider rural economy

2. Novelty - production

3. The government of markets

4. The creation of new institutional frameworks

5. Co-production and the creation of sustainability

6. Social capital

Multi-functional and intra-sectoral intertwinement (the structure of rural societies and economics)

The quality of life in rural areas

Figure 5.1: Theoretical model for the analysis of rural ‘webs’, from van der Ploeg and Marsden (2008)
\textit{"endogeneity seems to have strong interactions with the novelty domain. When this interaction involves social capital, new institutional frameworks develop and the objectives of sustainability are more thoroughly met. In the absence of social capital, the positive interaction between endogeneity and novelty still fortifies local market governance, but it does not generally lead to the creation of new institutional arrangements, without which the outcomes of the web in terms of sustainable development seem to be weaker."} (Kanemasu et al., 2008, p. 188)

The second dimension is \textit{novelty-production}, which refers to "the capacity, within the region, to continuously improve processes of production, products, patterns of cooperation, etc." (van der Ploeg et al., 2008, p. 9). Novelties are argued to provide new insights, practices and artefacts that improve constellations of actions within the web, but which also push boundaries and understandings. For Ventura et al. (2008), "the web provides a protected space in which novelties can be brought to light, developed and circulated, thus contributing to the complexity and diversity of the web" (p. 170). Novelty-production was identified as a central dimension in eight of the ETUDE case studies (Kanemasu et al., 2008); it is strongly associated with endogeniety and with contextual knowledge, and thus with capacities developed by ‘learning regions’ (see section 5.3), but can also more simply mean finding new uses for land and crops.

The third dimension is \textit{sustainability}, or more specifically in the ETUDE study, the development of activities whose economic value is linked to their ecological performance (Ventura et al., 2008). Kanemasu et al. (2008) identify the creation of sustainability as a key dimension in eight of the ETUDE case studies, but note that form of project and interaction with other domains differs. Nonetheless, they conclude that the creation of sustainability always needs significant interaction with social capital, with this interaction promoting endogeneity and the governance of markets, and that new institutional frameworks may emerge where novelty is also present. Collectively, these elements provide the basis for an emerging Eco-economy (Kitchen and Marsden, 2009), encompassing actions
such as agro-ecology, rewarding ecosystem services, and renewable energy production.

The fourth dimension of the web is social capital, or “the ability to get things done collectively” (van der Ploeg et al., 2008, p. 10). The significance of social capital for rural and regional development has been extensively documented (e.g. Árnason et al., 2009; Cecchi, 2009; Magnani and Struffi, 2009; Shucksmith, 2000; Stenbacka and Tillberg Mattsson, 2009). The ETUDE research reinforced this observation, identifying social capital as the principal domain in seven case studies, but also noting that the function of social capital varies. In some cases, social capital acts as the initiator that triggers positive developments in endogeneity, market governance, sustainability and/or novelty production, in other cases it is a lubricant to the interaction between domains – for example between market governance and novelty in enhancing sustainability (Kanemasu et al., 2008). More broadly, “social capital allows alignment around values and cognitive frameworks, and is therefore a resource that can make a specific rural discourse hegemonic within a rural area” (Ventura et al., 2008, p. 170), thus helping to embed the new rural development paradigm.

The fifth dimension concerns the development of new institutional frameworks and arrangements, which Kanemasu et al. (2008) identify as the dominant domain in 20 of the ETUDE case studies. Unsurprisingly, there is a strong synergy between the creation of new institutional arrangements and social capital, often enhanced by an element of endogeneity or novelty. New institutional arrangements “can codify existing unwritten rules and relationships into formal rules and thereby give stability to rural webs” (Ventura et al., 2008, p. 171), but they may also “facilitate a further extension of rural webs, providing rules and resources that encourage building social capital, enhancing the sustainability of economic activities and alternative food networks” (ibid.). As such, new institutional arrangements can contribute to outcomes such as enhanced market governance and strengthened sustainability.

The final dimension of the web is market governance, which refers to the “institutional capacity to control and strengthen markets and to construct new ones”, related to the organization of supply chains, and to the distribution of
surplus value and the benefits of collective action (van der Ploeg et al., 2008, p. 11). Market governance hence corresponds with questions about the global engagement and local embeddedness of rural business networks, as discussed in Deliverable 1.1., and queries how rural regions can exert more control over these networks and strengthen embeddedness. Ventura et al. (2008) suggest that market governance is therefore about protecting and enhancing the distinctiveness of rural products:

"The rural web is a generator of distinctiveness. This distinctiveness is embedded in rural products and services, which benefit from it as this feeds strategies of differentiation on local and global markets. In order to differentiate their products, rural producers need to be in control of operations, and, above all, the flow of communication towards consumers." (Ventura et al., 2008, p. 172)

The ETUDE findings suggest that the governance of markets was the main domain in seven of their 63 case studies, and that novelty production plays the crucial role in triggering the process through which actions are taken leading to greater control over the market, with key inputs from social capital and endogeneity. Reflecting the focus of ETUDE on the agri-food sector, the examples of enhanced market governance cited include the creation of alternative food networks, and institutional arrangements protecting PDO and PGI designations.

Drawing together these findings, Kanemasu et al. (2008) suggest a number of recurrent tendencies that they position as significant for conceptualizing the operation of rural-regional development. These include (from Kanemasu et al., 2008, p. 205):

- Social capital tends to function as an initiator and also as a lubricant that mediates and consolidates positive domain interrelations;
- Market governance, sustainability and endogeneity often constitute key outcomes of positive domain interrelations;
- Significant simultaneity and synergy tend to exist between novelty and endogeneity;
- Significant simultaneity and synergy tend to exist between novelty and new institutional arrangements;
- Significant simultaneity and synergy tend to exist between social capital and new institutional arrangements;
- Significant simultaneity and synergy tend to exist between social capital and (especially social) sustainability;
- In successful rural development initiatives, the initiating domains (most evidently social capital) as well as the outcomes are often reproduced and further strengthened; and,
- The denser the web of domain interrelations, the greater the sustainability outcomes/potential.

As a model for rural-regional development, the rural web is argued to help “to understand rural development strategies in terms of ‘reflexive territorialisation’ that produces differentiation and positions rural regions within global networks” (Ventura et al., 2008, p. 170). Indeed, a major strength of the web approach is its flexibility and its responsiveness to the diversity of rural regions. The emphasis is not on producing a blue-print that can be applied across rural regions, but rather on identifying and enhancing the particular tendencies evident within specific rural regions. However, Marsden and van der Ploeg (2008), recognize that the development of rural webs (and therefore the capacity for rural-regional development), is also structured by political-economic context:

"It is clear from our foregoing analysis that particular regions can be highly conducive to the creation and unfolding of rural webs, whilst others might run counter to this. This might be due to the reigning politics, class formations and associated constellation of land-based property rights. The comparison, for example, between England on the one hand, Wales and Scotland on the other is, in this respect very telling. Marsden and Sonnino [2008], for instance, demonstrate how the politics and differential governance of the devolved regions of Wales, and to a lesser extent South-west England, are providing a more fertile basis for endogenous rural development based upon more multi-functional principles, than in the more agricultural productivist English lowlands. Similarly we see significant differences in the political and economic ‘framing’ of rural development in The Netherlands and Italy, with the latter adopting a far more endogenous
In this context, Marsden and van der Ploeg present endogenous rural-regional development as almost an insurgent activity: “Many key players begin to work within the interstices of these prevailing structures; they literally create *spaces of deviation and resistance* in which web developments and their different but interlinked domains can occur” (ibid., emphasis in original). As such, Marsden and van der Ploeg see the development of rural webs as contributing to the reconstitution of rural places, chiming with the process of the reconstitution of rural places under globalization discussed in section 4.2:

> “The **self-propelling unfolding of the web** – that engages the domains of endogeneity, novelty, sustainability, social capital, new institutional arrangements and the re-governance of markets – involves the ability to reshape spaces, both locally, and possibly regionally and ecologically. The social ability to reconfigure these spatial elements away from the dominant structures is a key feature of the rural web.” (Marsden and van der Ploeg, 2008, p. 230).

However the ETUDE project, and the discussion of its findings in van der Ploeg and Marsden (2008), pays little regard to globalization, except as a context for the changes in rural-regional development that it investigates. The focus of the research was very much on endogenous development, and the rural webs that it promotes are counter-structures advanced by local, endogenous actors against globalization. This has two implications for engagement with the ideas proposed in van der Ploeg and Marsden (2008) in DERREG. Firstly, the model of the rural web and the detailed analysis of the interactions between its constitutive domains in different regional settings has value to DERREG as a vehicle for identifying the opportunities that exist for interventions by regional actors in the restructuring of rural places through globalization, and for understanding how and why these opportunities may vary between regions. Yet, secondly, we may want to be critical of the neglect of exogenous actors in ETUDE, and question whether any of the elements within the rural web can truly be operationalised...
solely through endogenous action, or whether in all cases they will involve some form of hybrid engagement of both local and non-local actors.

5.3. Rural-Regional Development and Knowledge

The final perspective on rural-regional development to note from the existing literature is the role and significance of knowledge production and circulation. This will be discussed only briefly here as it is more fully considered in Wellbrock et al. (2009) in relation to work package 4.

Knowledge has been prioritised as a resource in economic development by theorists of the emergent ‘knowledge society’ or ‘knowledge economy’, in which hi-tech, science, media, communications and information sectors dominate, and in which economic progress is driven by technological innovation. However, as Tovey (2008) notes, “the extent to which actual economic development in rural societies and settings can conform to this model is questionable” (p. 186). She observes that rural knowledge about plants and animals, for example, is often only valued in order to appropriate it for biotechnology, and that “innovation as a science-based, technical process appears to be widely understood among both urban and rural actors, as something alien to rural practices and institutions” (ibid; see also Dargan and Shucksmith, 2008, Doloreux, 2003).

Tovey, though, challenges the privileging of technical and expert knowledge in this discourse of the knowledge economy, and observes that critics have suggested that “science no longer holds the authoritative claim to truth that it was once credited with, and that what counts as ‘expertise’ is increasingly contextualised and localised to the situation of its construction and application” (Tovey, 2008, p 188). She argues that this position opens up “the possibility of talking about knowledges in the plural, as diverse, and differentiated, rather than in a singular identification of knowledge with science, and point to relations between different forms of knowledge as an aspect of development that needs no more attention” (pp 188-189). This includes giving greater attention to the potential contribution of lay and local knowledges, which as Tovey (2008) observes have already begun to be emphasized in discourses of rural development: “Local knowledge appears as an economic resource in culture
economy arguments for neo-endogenous rural development ... and as a development resource in the new paradigm rural development literature” (p. 185; see also Ray, 1998; van der Ploeg et al., 2000).

Moreover, Tovey contends that globalization simultaneously requires both technological, expert knowledges that feed the knowledge economy, and local, indigenous knowledges that facilitate the reconstitution of local places and the enrolment of locally-embedded resources. Following Jasanoff and Martello (2004), she suggests that “globalisation thus both supports the production of a global ‘science of sustainable development’ ... and simultaneously has ‘the paradoxical effect of renewing commitment to locally specific ways of knowing and responding to environmental [and other] problems’ (Jasanoff and Martello, 2004, p 335)” (Tovey, 2008, p 190).

Indeed, a number of ways can be identified in which knowledge is central to the dynamics of rural-regional development in the emergent global countryside, and is both contributed and employed by both local and non-local actors:

- Globalization promotes the standardization of knowledge, through the circulation of information through the global media and the creation of a global consumer culture, and through demands for standardization in the production and presentation of commodities;
- The global economy favours regions that can readily meet the requirements for standardization, with flattened local regulatory systems and a labour force that is equipped with the ‘correct’ technical, linguistic and managerial knowledge;
- The progression of the global economy requires innovation, and thus also favours regions with strong systems to support innovation, including creative conditions for knowledge generation and support structures to facilitate knowledge transfer between research, education and industry (Crevoisier and Jeannerat, 2009; Doloreux, 2003, 2004; Skuras et al., 2005);
- Local and lay knowledges are important, however, in securing the successful enrolment of local resources by global networks and the successful reconstitution of place through globalization. These include knowledge about local markets and cultural preferences, and knowledge about sustainable
resource management and the local environment (Jasanoff and Martello, 2004; Skuras et al., 2005; Woods, 2007b);

- Local and lay knowledges can also be important in innovation, particularly in terms of encouraging novelty-production and developing endogeneity, as emphasized in the model of the ‘rural web’ (van der Ploeg et al. and Marsden, 2008; see also Dargan and Shucksmith, 2008; Fonte, 2008; Siebert et al., 2008);

- Regions can also benefit from the global circulation of knowledge by learning from the experience of other regions, drawing on knowledge transferred by migrants (including return migrants and migrant workers), inward investors and rural-regional development professionals, as well as through the global media and by inter-regional co-operation in programmes such as LEADER (Dargan and Shucksmith, 2008; Ray, 2001).

Drawing on the findings of the CORASON project in Framework Programme 6, Bruckmeier and Tovey (2008) argue for a more sophisticated model that can accommodate the complex dynamics involved in the fusing of different knowledge types and practices of knowledge within sustainable rural development and resource management. They suggest that the CORASON research, “revealed not only the blending of knowledge types and the difficulties of demarcating type boundaries but also the problems of conceptualising knowledge dynamics of knowledge building processes in rural development” (Bruckmeier and Tovey, 2008, p 325). In particular they argue for a shift in focus from forms of knowledge to knowledge processes, exploring dimensions of knowledge building, collaborative social learning and the re-embedding of knowledge. As such, they seek to examine ‘knowledge in action’, “as part of co-production of knowledge, social and material products, in discourses and research processes, with different knowledge producers participating” (ibid, p. 321).

Although CORASON involved localized case studies, it was intentionally aspatial in its analysis, seeking to draw out general principles about knowledge in sustainable resource management and rural development. Understanding the impact of globalization on rural regions, and in particular, informing the formulation of rural-regional development strategies to respond to the challenge
of globalization, however, requires a more focused understanding of how knowledge processes operate at the regional level and how regional institutions, policies and practices can support the production and application of knowledge.

The concept of ‘learning regions’ can help to provide an insight into these issues. Although derived from new regionalism and primarily applied to predominantly urban regions (Florida, 1995; Storper, 1993; Rutten and Boekema, 2007), DERREG contends that the ‘learning regions’ model can be adapted and applied to rural regions. As discussed further by Wellbrock et al. (2009), the concept of learning regions holds that regional learning builds individual and collective capacities that contribute to regional development by enabling more effective participation in the global knowledge economy. Regional learning is sustained by three constitutive pillars of ‘region’, ‘government’ and ‘knowledge’, with interaction mediated through the interfaces of ‘development initiatives’, ‘supporting policies’ and ‘facilities’ (figure 5.2). The assumption is that stronger connections produce a more robust learning region which in turn can compete more effectively in the global economy. This assumption will be tested in WP 4, which will examine the actual constitution and functioning of these structures, connections and processes in six of the DERREG case study regions.

Figure 5.2: The learning region – analytical framework (from Wellbrock et al., 2009)
6. Conclusions

The purpose of this paper has been to set out the contextual background and the conceptual framework for the DERREG project. The discussion in the paper has outlined the various range of perspectives adopted in rural studies and related disciplines to the analysis of globalization, as well as to the modelling of social and economic development. From this analysis a number of principles can be drawn that will serve to provide the conceptual framework for DERREG:

1. Rural regions are dynamic, contingent and constantly evolving spaces, and the impact of contemporary globalization must be positioned in an historical trajectory of social and economic transformation.

2. Globalization has multiple meanings and can be understood as a process (or set of processes), a condition and as discourse, and these different states can be interconnected and interdependent.

3. Globalization is multi-faceted, involving economic, social, cultural, environmental and political dimensions, which can operate in parallel, in opposition, or entwined with each other; developing an holistic understanding of globalization in rural space requires engaging with each of these dimensions.

4. The intersection of globalization dimensions happens in places, and it is in places that global networks, flows and actors engage with local structures and actors to forge new social and economic formations, re-making place in the process.

5. As such, the global is (re)produced through the local, at the same time as the local is reshaped by the global.
6. Globalization requires a rethinking of spatial scale; globalization has not eradicated scalar differences, but has reconfigured scalar relations such that scale is now more about reach than about hierarchy.

7. The local (re)production of the global creates opportunities for economic and social entrepreneurship, employing skills, knowledge and resources that may be locally embedded or sourced through transnational networks and flows, and with the potential to access global markets and stages.

8. Economic development strategies have evolved with globalization, with an increased emphasis on the valorization of locally embedded resources targeting expanded markets; yet, the capacity of local economies to successfully engage with global markets is still shaped by social, political and geographical context.

9. Rural economic development involves the hybrid interconnection of diverse components including endogeneity, novelty and innovation, sustainability, social capital, institutional frameworks, and methods of market governance; these components get configured differently in different localities.

10. Institutional structures and practices are important in shaping rural development realities, including opportunity structures for entrepreneurship and sustainable development, and capacities for regional learning.

The over-arching principle is that rural regions are not necessarily the victims of globalization – as they have sometimes been represented – but that rural actors are active agents in the production and (re)production of globalization, and in the remaking of rural places under globalization. This leads us to adopt a transformationalist perspective on globalization, recognizing that globalization is incomplete and that its outcomes are not pre-determined, as well as to the use of other concepts that emphasise the potential of localities, including the theory of learning regions. The key challenges for DERREG are hence to demonstrate how regional engagement with globalization is being enacted in different rural
settings within Europe, and to derive lessons from these observations that can assist rural regions across Europe in developing effective responses to globalization and its impacts.
REFERENCES


Vaishar A (2006)


